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ABSTRACT
Modern states and legal structures around the world are pressed by the forces of
globalization to accommodate increasingly diverse multicultural populations. Older and
more frequently followed models for cultural integration are rooted in theories of
assimilation or liberal pluralism. These theories can demand unbalanced changes from
either minority communities or the state. Few theories identify the dual process of
interdependence necessary for the democratic inclusion of diverse minority communities
in Europe. This thesis explores the historical intent and shortcomings of immigration and
integration legislation as it relates to ethnic minority communities in Great Britain and
the Netherlands, and makes a case for including a balanced interdependence model in the
political discussion of multiculturalism. I argue that promoting multicultural
interdependence through immigration and integration legislation could preserve both
European democratic institutions and the benefits of difference, in much the same way
that the European Union has preserved the legacy of the state.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM, METHODOLOGY, AND STRUCTURE

I. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND CENTRAL PROBLEM
The aim of the project at hand is to evaluate legal challenges to successful
democratic pluralism and multicultural citizenship in Great Britain and the Netherlands—
two European Union countries which have approached the integration of minority
communities in distinct ways. The dilemmas guiding this research are twofold. Firstly,
the thesis will assess the effectiveness of immigration and integration legislation in
supporting multi-ethnic societies and democratic integration in Great Britain and the
Netherlands. Secondly, the thesis will evaluate the potential of European Union
legislation as an alternative model for supporting cosmopolitan citizenship in EU member
states. The central goal of the thesis will be to more clearly analyze the shortcomings of
current attempts at pluralism in two EU countries, and to provide a new theoretical model
for accommodating growing multicultural societies in Europe.

II. COMPELLING REASONS FOR STUDY
Three key motivations have convinced me of the importance of devoting serious
time and effort to such an area of research. First, the phenomenon of globalization as it
relates to legal structures and individuals is relatively under-studied in comparison to the
more popular economic and technological facets of globalization. Growing numbers of
communities with hybrid cultures and transnational attachments confront inflexibility in
the legal sphere—a reality which should not go unstudied. Second, the unique political
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structure of the European Union provides examples of both transnational governance, as
well as traditional statehood. Using European Union member states as subjects for study
allows for research which touches on both the field of modern globalization studies and
more classical political theory. Finally, a changing international political environment
places increased global responsibility and accountability on states and transnational
institutions to maintain universal democracy. These new demands encourage fresh
contributions to academic theory and legal structure. As scholars like Will Kymlicka
argue, “finding morally defensible and politically viable answers” to the challenges of
diversity and human rights is perhaps “the greatest challenge facing democracies today.”1
Grappling with this challenge from the perspective of law—perhaps one of the oldest
institutions in the history of statehood—is a particularly important endeavor.

III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Though many questions may emerge from the breadth of the research completed
in the present thesis, three have motivated my own work. The first two questions are
broader, while the final deals precisely with the content of the case studies. First, I seek to
explore why minorities are increasingly finding it difficult to “belong” to their immigrant
host-countries. Second, the thesis is motivated by a desire to understand how the state,
citizenship, and individual identity are influenced or changed by globalization. Finally,
the two case studies attempt to examine how and to what extent traditional models
guiding immigration and integration legislation make immigrants’ efforts at democratic
integration more difficult.
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IV. CENTRAL CONCEPTS
I have chosen five concepts as the foundation of my literature review which
explore the power of globalization and the state in the definition of identity and
citizenship. These concepts include the state, citizenship, globalization, integration, and
legal pluralism. Each concept adds to the discussion on citizenship and identity in an era
of globalization. The sections on the state, citizenship, and globalization explore the
relationship between the individual and the state, and the challenges of new social
contracts and diverse communities in an era of globalization. The sections on integration
and legal pluralism introduce a variety of traditional options for managing migration, and
begin to illustrate some of the difficulties associated with such models in an era of
globalization and hybridized identities.
The five concepts emerge together to paint a portrait of the multiple avenues
where immigration and integration law combine with state and multicultural community
relationships.i Each concept begins to articulate a conversation about the state which
suggests that identity and its relationship to the state has fundamentally changed. No
longer are states homogenous, nor is citizenship necessarily reflective of a particular
identity. Furthermore, globalization increases the possibility and probability of a single
individual embodying and cherishing ‘multiple’ identities, or even seamlessly hybrid
identities. Modern developments in immigration and integration law make ‘seamless’
i

Though the term ‘multiculturalism’ is not included as a separate concept, it remains essential to the
present discussions. I use the term to signify the diversity of community, ethnicity, race, culture, etc. that is
increasingly dominating center stage across political agendas in Europe. Whether European communities
are intentionally multicultural or not, the diversity of their societies requires active engagement with
community groups that are often seen to be ‘at odds’ with the larger society as a whole. I am largely of the
opinion that multicultural debate and negotiation (through which cultural hybrids emerge) is positive,
though only when respectful and democratic forums can be maintained. Additional literature suggests that
multicultural engagements may not necessarily be either realistic or beneficial for national communities. I
have chosen not to review this literature as a result of both space constraints and the reality that both case
studies for the purpose of this thesis actively recognize their multicultural communities in some way.
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cultural hybridity somewhat more difficult, especially when identities emerge in
opposition to one another. The larger portion of the thesis explores two case studies
which have historically negotiated such a problematic of difference through immigration
and integration law.

V. RESEARCH TECHNIQUES, STRATEGIES, AND A NOTE ON THE CASE STUDIES
I have relied on three techniques for research throughout my thesis. The first
portion of the thesis, which defines central concepts, relies on secondary sources
published by scholars on each of the main themes. These academic resources place the
thesis within a specific scholarly context, and lay the conceptual framework on which the
thesis rests. The analysis of case studies in the second and third portions of the thesis
relies on primary sources, including legal documents, cases, and interpretations which
illustrate state responses to minority integration in the studied countries. Secondary
academic resources and the analysis of authors in the field of anthropology and legal
studies support the primary sources in the two case study sections.

A Note on the Case Studies
While a more lengthy work could address a larger array of European examples,
my own analysis is limited by several practical factors. Time and thesis capacity limits
are particularly acute in the case of an undergraduate thesis. An additional research
obstacle is provided by the vast quantity of literature available and my proficiency in
primarily English sources. These constraints impact the number of case studies analyzed,
and also the theoretical literature discussed.
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Working against these factors, I have selected the Netherlands and Great Britain
as case studies which provide distinct historical negotiations with pluralism and ethnic
minority populations. The past academic year gave me the opportunity to spend a
semester in both locations, and I thus have an increased familiarity with the obstacles of
‘difference’ that are unique to the UK and the Netherlands. Both case study countries
have a long history of migration and immigration legislation, and have made significant
changes to this legislation over the past few decades. The UK and the Netherlands have
also employed a similar range of assimilation and pluralistic policies in an effort to
integrate minority and immigrant communities.
Thus, the case studies chosen for this study are not arbitrary, and they speak to a
larger European phenomenon of legal negotiation with cultural difference. Several edited
works deal more comprehensively with European immigration, and are a valuable asset
to both the theoretical and historical dimensions of this thesis. Andrew Geddes has
contributed a complete study of EU countries with his book The Politics of Migration and
Immigration in Europe2 and Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil (eds.) have similarly
approached nationality law in their book Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship,
Immigration, and Nationality Law in the EU.3

VI. PERSONAL PREPARATION AND BACKGROUND
From the beginning of my journey as a student at Macalester College, the
possibility of completing an honors thesis in my senior year has been an undertaking I
have steadily looked and worked forward to. From the introductory course on
globalization, to two independent tutorials on globalization and the European Union in
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my sophomore year, and finally to two semesters abroad, the seriousness of my courses
have directed me toward the rewarding efforts of writing a thesis as the capstone of my
career at Macalester. Two semesters abroad in London, England and Maastricht,
Netherlands, offered me a valuable opportunity to explore the place of ethnic minorities
from a European legal perspective. A seminar on Ethnic Minorities in British Law while
studying in London, and an independent study on a similar subject with a legal studies
professor in Maastricht further honed my interest in the legal responses to the cultural
hybrids that result from globalization.

VII. FACULTY MENTOR
Following a significant career of mentorship under the guidance of Professor
Ahmed Samatar in the Department of International Studies, it seems most appropriate
that he should once again direct my studies in the form of an honors thesis. Professor
Samatar’s expertise in globalization and global citizenship studies are an invaluable asset
as I begin the writing process, and his commitment to excellence is both challenging and
inspirational. His familiarity with my learning and writing styles has also proved
advantageous throughout the significant task of constructing and editing the thesis.

VIII. CENTRAL CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECT OUTLINE
Approaching the topic of multiculturalism in a multi-state polity like the
European Union is a complicated task, but it is necessary in an effort to understand the
multicultural challenges that the growing Union faces today. More generally, the thesis
seeks to assess the impact of Dutch and British legislation on the success of attempts at
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multicultural citizenship and legal pluralism. My research suggests three central
conclusions. First, new immigrants confront immigration policies that highlight economic
contributions and fail to reinforce the value of democratic institutions. Minorities feel
detached from democratic institutions at entry, and are either intent on returning home, or
resistant to change. In either case, minority groups remain incompletely integrated into
European cultures. Second, new immigrants (or more ‘adapted’ older migrants) become
forced hybrids with citizenship rights that are imperfectly explained or incompletely
protected through permanent legal structures. To put it simply, globalization has
magnified and increased the number of cultural hybrids, but the state and its institutions
of citizenship are still navigating this new world. Third, state legislators continue to be
guided by polarized theoretical models in their efforts to ‘globalize’ their democratic
processes and institutions. Rather than seeking a more balanced model for immigration
and integration, European states rely on assimilation or pluralist models which encourage
cultural ‘enclaves.’
In order to begin resolving these problems, immigration and integration
legislation should be revised around an interdependence model which seeks to recognize
both the benefits and challenges of nurturing migrant communities. I use the European
Union’s institutions as a model for integration which promotes collaboration between
highly diverse communities, as a result of common investment in institutions and
common security. Though the European Union is far from a perfect polity, it does
provide a unique lens for considering the possibilities of a more diverse ‘union’ within
states themselves that emerges from the benefits of diversity itself.
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The first portion of the thesis reviews the available literature on several concepts
which are essential to the larger illustration of pluralism in the two European cases
studied. These concepts include the state, citizenship, globalization, integration models,
and legal pluralism. The second and third portions of the thesis outline and analyze Great
Britain and the Netherlands as two case studies whose legislation creates unique obstacles
for multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan societies. Portions two and three explore the legal
challenges of accommodating what Ulrich Beck calls “transnational place polygamy,”—a
term which describes the processes of transnational attachment, cultural mixing,
adaptation and “globalization of biography” that result from globalization.4
In the Dutch and the British cases, changes in immigration and integration
legislation reflect growing tension between minority or hybrid communities and ‘native’
communities. As this thesis will suggest, however, this instability will not be made right
through policies which insist on assimilation to a one-dimensional cultural or national
identity. At the same time, pluralistic legislation which seeks to integrate the legal
systems of countless minority cultures is equally impractical and difficult to maintain. In
both case studies, legislative amendments must find a middle ground which both defines
the rights and obligations of citizenship in a democratic state, and protects minority
interests.
The final portion of the thesis will place the evaluations of the case study
countries into the larger context of the European Union’s attempts to define its own
Nationality Law. The thesis also explores the possibility of an EU constitution as a
practical model for defining the rights and obligations of transnational citizenship.
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The organizational structure of the project will consist of several thematic
chapters, outlined below.
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Main Concepts
I. State
II. Citizenship
III. Globalization
III. Integration
IV. Legal Pluralism
Chapter 3: Case Study Review: An Evaluation of Immigration and Integration
Legislation in the United Kingdom
Chapter 4: Case Study Review: Challenges of Legal Pluralism in the Netherlands
Chapter 5: Searching for E pluribus Unum: Democracy, Citizenship, and
Constitutionality in the European Union
Chapter 6: Conclusion
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Several thematic areas of literature guide the present analysis of European
immigration and integration legislation. Though I have narrowed this thesis to two case
studies, the theoretical background available on statehood, globalization, integration,
pluralism, and citizenship is more generally reflective of global phenomena outside the
case countries and the European continent. This portion of the thesis does not attempt to
review the entirety of the literature on each of these subjects, but rather offers reflections
on several elucidating texts within each field. As a whole, the chosen literature attempts
to reflect the impact that globalization has had on state processes of democratic and
multicultural citizenship. The final sections present several theoretical tools for managing
difference through legal channels, and suggest limitations for their practical realization in
democratic communities.
The first portion of this chapter evaluates theories of statehood and state
sovereignty, approaching the major questions and dilemmas that have emerged over time.
The second section builds on these theories of statehood with an analysis of citizenship.
The third portion analyzes the influential changes that globalization has on both statehood
and citizenship, before introducing the more specific theories relevant to minority and
immigrant integration in the fourth portion. The final section will analyze in more detail
the concept of pluralism from a legal perspective—introducing two central texts as a
framework for analysis. A few concluding statements will raise central theoretical
questions that guide the thesis and the explorations of the case studies.
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II. THE STATE
Debates about state sovereignty are almost inseparable from modern academic
conversations about globalization and law, and thus a discussion of ethnic minorities in
European law would be wholly incomplete without some reference to theories on the
state. In order to understand state legislation, it is first necessary to understand the
debates about the state and its responsibilities. In particular, three areas of state theory
emerge as essential contributions to the present discussion.
The first essential theme in state theory labels the state as a center of power. As
Joseph Camilleri notes, historical scholarship is divided on this issue.5 He identifies
absolutist theorists like Bodin and Hobbes as scholars who define the state primarily as
“individuals and institutions that exercise supreme authority within a given territory or
society...identified with the power to make, administer, and enforce laws and with the
network of institutions necessary for this purpose.”6 In contrast, he introduces Burke,
Rousseau, and Hegel as theorists who understand the state as “not just the institutions of
government but the politically organized society, the body politic, or the nation...the state
is a community of free people based on an implicit or explicit consensus.”7 In both cases,
states are endowed with a “supreme coercive power,” but this power is derived from a
variety of different sources.8
In the first, state power can be seen best through Weber’s definition of a state as a
polity which “successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within
a given territory.”9 Hall argues that Weber references not the haphazard use of force, but
the “sanctioned domination” that is arrived at through a combination of legitimacy and
authority deemed acceptable to society.10 In this understanding, the center of power lies
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within the state institutions themselves, rather than outside them. In the second, societalbased understanding of the state, the primary centers of state power are located, if
imperfectly, within the “body politic,” or a consensus-giving body of free individuals.11
As Hall writes, state practices are legitimized through a system of law and “the forms
through which the citizens are represented or agree by formal electoral procedures.”12
Despite differences in understanding the appropriateness of using force and the centers of
state power, both sides of the theoretical spectrum share an interest in the relationship
between state power and state subjects.
The common interest in the “body politic” between radically different schools of
political theory brings us to a second theme important to the present discussion, namely
the position of the individual and civil society in relation to the state. In the Hobbesian
context, Camilleri notes that the concept of “a social contract between ruler and ruled”
was “substituted for...a contract in which all individuals agreed to submit to the state.”13
Under this type of social contract, the individual relationship with the state is one of
submission, with few limits. In contrast, the Lockean branch of state theory takes a very
different perspective on this contract, while maintaining the traditionalist views on state
sovereignty. In the Lockean conception, “society and the state existed to preserve
individual rights...and...such rights were a limitation on the authority of both state and
society.”14 As Camilleri highlights, the Lockean understanding of the social contract
places the power of the state in the consent of civil society—a consent which “could be
given only in return for adequate protection of individual rights.”15
This understanding of the relationship between society and the state informs the
notion that “the whole machinery of the state was supposed to be activated and controlled
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through law.”16 Poggi alludes to the power of law in mediating the relationship between
state and subject when he writes “The activity of legislation itself...had aspects of utter
discretionality, for it expressed the sovereign...will of the state. However...it was
surrounded by constitutional constraints—both rules of procedure and sets of inviolable
rights.”17 In short, the law represents a crucial medium for mediating the relationship
between individuals and the unrestrained use of state force. Even when it is imperfect,
law remains the textual representation of the state’s investment in the maintenance of
social order.
The law as a product of the sovereign state can protect or destroy the liberties
associated with a Lockean social contract. When laws protecting individual liberties are
enforced, the social contract is inevitably strengthened. When state disrespect for the law
or restrictive legislation fails to support society as a whole, the social contract loses its
potency. In the Hobbesian interpretation, maintaining sovereignty in law meant “doing
away with every right of the people,” while Locke argued that sovereignty could only be
maintained through respect for natural and moral laws that trumped state-created
legislation.18
Locke and Hobbes suggest two important roles for law in state theory. On one
hand, law can buttress the sovereign will of the state, particularly when it is backed by
state force. On the other hand, law can limit the powers of the state in favor of its
citizens—protecting them and affirming their power as a part of civil society. Stuart Hall
argues that the development of the modern state is characterized by “states in which
power is shared; rights to participate in government are legally or constitutionally
defined; representation is wide...and the boundaries of national sovereignty are clearly
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defined.”19 He also highlights the supreme importance of individual liberties in the
modern state. Where previous regimes had used law to overrun these liberties, the
modern state was expected protect them, and “interference...could no longer be at the
whim of crown or state, but had to be sanctioned legally. Even the state was subject to
law.”20 The development of international organizations and international law has
solidified this respect for the rights of the individual, though the power of the state’s
sovereignty is continuously an obstacle to the protection of these internationally
sanctioned rights, and the debate is far from complete.
This discussion of the state is important to the present thesis for three reasons.
First, debates about the role of law as a mediator between the sovereign state and
individuals are essential to a discussion of modern states with diverse minority
populations. In the two case studies analyzed, law is seen as a way to enforce the strict
boundaries of the sovereign state, rather than as a dynamic medium for recreating the
‘body politic’ and protecting individual liberties. Second, classical theories may offer
insight into managing the challenges of citizenship in an era of globalization. Classical
state theory suggests that the Hobbesian state with its strict boundaries and few liberties
is not the only option, though modern states may emulate this model more frequently.
Rather, theorists like Rousseau and Locke suggest that law and state sovereignty can be
invested in the protection of a diverse body politic and individual liberties. In an era of
globalization, this latter understanding may prove more fruitful, particularly if it
encourages diverse democratic polities which balance the legal obligations of citizenship
with respect for difference. Finally, a discussion of the state is important for purely
practical reasons. Despite some scholarly predictions which suggest the end of the state,
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the state continues to be the most important institution in international affairs which can
maintain an effective social contract with the individual in the form of citizenship.

III. CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship, in its simplest form, connotes the “social contract” between a state
and the individuals that are ruled by and create state institutions.21 As Poggi writes,
citizenship is “a set of mutual claims and growing claims and reciprocal involvements
binding together the state and the individuals.”22 Though definitions for citizenship have
varied over time, most generally acknowledge citizenship as a relationship with “mutual
rights and responsibilities.”23 Croucher, for example, identifies T.H. Marshall’s definition
of the civil, political, and social rights associated with ideal citizenship as an increasingly
influential guide for modern citizenship.24 Three debates about citizenship will guide this
thesis.
First, the concept of citizenship recalls the debates about state sovereignty and the
social contract, with a particular focus on the role of civil society and individually
protected rights as limits on state power. Alfonso Alfonsi identifies two forms of
citizenship.25 The first, known as the “Aristotelian-republican model,” identifies citizens
as “one who either takes, or is subject to decisions,” and who “can develop their own
personal identity only within the framework of common traditions and recognized
political institutions.”26 In the second “Lockean-liberal” model, “individuals remained
external to the state, contributing to it in terms of certain rights and obligations...The state
was, in its turn, to guarantee individual rights and equal treatment to its citizens.”27 In the
first, the role of a citizen is incredibly limited, while in the second, the citizen is actively
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involved in the creation and sustenance of the polity. The first seems to prevent an active
civil society, while the second encourages it. Poggi writes:
A potentially participant citizenry imposes powerful constraints on the autonomy
of elites; and these constraints are probably all the more significant to the extent that the
logic of social, economic and cultural advance calls forth...an increasingly diversified,
informed, sophisticated, demanding citizenry.28
The rights of participatory citizenship are even more important for multi-ethnic citizens
in an era of globalization. The practices of citizenship give minorities a voice in state
politics, and offer a set of ‘tools’ for maintaining hybrid identities.
A second important facet of citizenship raises the question of ‘belonging’ and
national identity, and the larger concept of the nation-state. Authors like Karl Deutsch
and Charles Tilly have supported the association of citizenship with nationality, though
T.K. Oommen’s theories are most useful for the current discussion with their argument
that this association is both historically and currently problematic.29 In particular,
Oommen discusses the “unstated assumption...that the population of a state ought to be
homogeneous and its citizens should be nationals,” in cases where the terminology of the
nation-state is used.30 In cases of historical state-sponsored movements toward
nationalism, Oommen argues that “most states have not achieved their avowed objective
of homogenization of their populations.”31 Nonetheless, efforts to fuse a static or
homogenous identity with the geographical borders are far from exhausted, and current
legal obstacles facing minority populations in Europe vividly illustrate these attempts.
In an era of globalization, Oommen suggests that “While nationality and ethnicity
as identities are exclusionary and could be inequality generating, citizenship can
essentially be inclusionary and equality oriented.”32 In a similar vein, Habermas notes
that citizenship can be defined as a fluid “‘patriotism of the constitution,’” in which “the
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very concept of nation adapts itself gradually to the affirmation of citizenship.”33 In
essence, the identity of the polity can be created and reaffirmed by its citizens through
processes of citizenship. This is particularly the case in democratic societies, where, as
James Rosenau highlights, “individuals...are deeply invested in the realization of both
their own and society’s needs.”34 In the case of hybrid or ethnic minority ‘citizens,’
legislation might support both needs at the individual level, and request commitments to
the larger societal and political needs of the country.
A final and more current quandary about citizenship is introduced by the concept
of transnational, or global citizenship. In addition to theories which suggest that states are
losing their claim on sovereignty, scholarship on citizenship follows a similar argument
in placing citizenship beyond state boundaries. In some cases, as in the European Union,
non-state citizenship is no longer a theory—it exists in fact, though it remains difficult to
catalogue “as postnational, or supranational or merely a sophisticated set of
intergovernmental agreements that mimic federal arrangements.”35 European Union
citizenship is associated with a variety of civil, political, and social rights, including the
right to vote in European elections, though state citizenship has not changed, and
European Union citizenship is given only to the citizens of the EU member states.36
Though the European Union removes the concept of citizenship from its traditional state
boundaries, authors like Seyla Benhabib argue that political rights are still largely linked
to the nation-state, and more importantly, membership in such a political community.37
Benhabib and other authors like Peter Singer look to the concept of global
citizenship as an effective way of building global communities endowed with both rights
and global responsibilities.38 Both Singer39 and Benhabib40 cite Kant’s theories on
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Perpetual Peace in their advocacy of global institutions of citizenship and global
communities. Benhabib examines the role of the state as an institution of political
membership, and argues that “New modalities of membership have emerged, with the
result that the boundaries of the political community, as defined by the nation-state
system, are no longer adequate to regulate membership.”41 Singer makes a similar
argument, though he suggests that numerous political problems contribute to the
necessity of a global government and community that can adequately confront such
pressing issues as global climate change and the enforcement of international law.
International institutions, global problems, and transnational cultures all contribute to a
redefined concept of citizenship, particularly for individuals who constantly cross
political borders. The larger concepts of transnational and global citizenship are two
admirable possibilities, though a more state-based concept of citizenship is still necessary
in the absence of international institutions which can uphold a ‘social contract’ or provide
essential goods and services.
The discussion of citizenship is important to the present thesis precisely because
of its growing flexibility in an age of globalization. Never before has the possibility of a
social contract which goes beyond the state been in reach. Though perhaps still far off,
the possibility may be increasingly attractive to individuals whose interests (like
minorities) are not being met by traditional state systems.

IV. GLOBALIZATION
Many early definitions of globalization have labeled complex technologies and
economic flows as the most significant features of the new global phenomenon. In
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contrast, others have labeled the movement of people and cultures as a driving force. Two
central impacts of globalization are essential to the present work.
First, globalization has had, and is having, profound impacts on the state as a
political and social institution, and on the practice of politics itself. Peter Singer argues
that this change results from the growth in international political and economic
institutions, international law, and the necessity of cooperative action in an effort to
resolve widespread global problems.42 In short, globalization has opened up the political
sphere to an international community. The state is no longer offering a monologue on the
world stage, and in cases of terrorism or private military groups, it no longer has a
monopoly on the use of force, legitimate or otherwise. State leaders negotiate with other
state leaders, but they also negotiate as frequently with representatives from nongovernmental organizations, with civil society groups, and with national and
transnational corporations. The greatest security threats for a state in the 21st century are
not limited to weapons proliferation, or even military conflict, but include the risks of
environmental crisis, HIV/AIDS, global poverty, and dozens of other internationally
pressing issues.
Sheila Croucher captures the impact of these realities by referencing Keohane and
Nye’s interdependence theories, which suggest that states have become dependent on
each other, both as a result of “resource needs, such as oil,” and a larger “degree of
coordination and cooperation among states that is not reducible to the realist model of
brute power relations.”43 More specifically, Keohane and Nye argue that international
politics in an era of modernization (or globalization) can be explained by a condition of
complex interdependence in which “transnational actors are increasingly important,
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military force is a less useful instrument, and welfare—not security—is becoming the
primary goal and concern of states.”44 Whether the realities of interdependence are
successfully managed, however, is a continuously debated question, particularly in a
post-September 11 world when issues of global security and international welfare erupt
violently when they are left unresolved.
Despite the importance of international actors and global problems, the state has
not disappeared, but must navigate the chaotic maelstroms of globalization’s storm. As
Joseph Camilleri writes, globalization does not herald the end of the state, but makes it
increasingly difficult for states to maintain “old” democratic institutions in the process.45
Though he wrote over ten years ago, he captures vividly the moment of great political
change that continues to challenge states today. Camilleri writes:
The contemporary period is one of considerable fluidity, when the most
fundamental questions regarding the exercise of power and authority have been
thrown back into the crucible of history...old habits and old ideas will persist even
as new ones develop to cope with the emergence of a pluralistic polity that is at
once part local, part regional, part national, and part transnational.46
In a sense, globalization has re-opened the classical debates about state power and
sovereignty, civil rights, and the power of law. These debates are particularly critical in
an analysis of globalization’s impact on the individual and identity. Hybrid identities and
transnational attachments complicate the traditional processes of democratic life—but
they also make concrete foundations of democracy more essential.
The second important facet of globalization for the present discussion is its ability
to redefine the nature of citizenship, complicate individual identity, and as a result,
change the face of national identity. This process is in part a practical one. As Stephen
Castles writes, “Well over 100 million people live outside their countries of birth today.
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Some 20 million of them are refugees,” and these migrants contribute significantly to
“the formation of new ethnic groups in receiving countries.”47 With the advance in
transportation and communication technologies, as well as the increase in refugee
populations and migrant flows, migration has become a more prominent reality for many
Western countries.48
In addition, globalization has had the more intangible effect of changing the
identity of migrants. Ulrich Beck writes that the sovereignty of the territorial state “is
grounded upon attachment to a particular place,” while globalization encourages global
networks, and a global society of networks—“none of them specific to any particular
locality” and which “cut across the boundaries of the national state.”49 Though the nationstate has certainly not become obsolete, Beck argues that globalization introduces the
possibility of a “cosmopolitan society” in which citizens worldwide are bound in “a
global nexus of responsibility” to each other.50 In addition to this possibility,
globalization also facilitates what he calls “transnational place polygamy,” and
“globalization of biography.”51 He defines ‘transnational place polygamy’ as a “marriage
to several places at once, belonging in different worlds...the gateway to globality in one’s
own life; it leads to the globalization of biography.”52 One only has to walk down a
cosmopolitan city street to realize the truth of Beck’s claims. Whether globalization of
biography occurs in German-Ethiopian, Polish-English, or Czech-Italian families, the
transnationality and diversity of attachments are too numerous to count. Equally valuable
for political scientists is the increasing frequency of successful cultural hybrids. For states
seeking to define a homogenous national identity, however, the globalization of
biographies is inevitably one of the greatest challenges to state sovereignty because it

- 21 -

means that the oppositions between “separate worlds (nations, religions, cultures, skin
colours, continents, etc.)...must or may lodge in a single life.”53 Resolving and learning to
accept these oppositions will be critical to navigating statehood in an era of globalization.
‘Globalization of biography’ may mean the acquisition of dual citizenship, but it
is also a more inherent transnational identity that resists boundaries. To the state seeking
to maintain its sovereign and homogenous authority, this facet of globalization could
prove insurmountable, particularly as globalization increases more diverse cultural
pairings and amalgams through global communication, immigration, and the movement
of individuals from around the world. In the endeavor to define a world community of
interdependent states, however, cosmopolitan citizens with globalized biographies could
be an asset in bridging the gap between the old sovereignty and the new.

V. INTEGRATION
Though the present thesis approaches topics central to state structures (in
particular the law), globalization, and citizenship, it also seeks to provide a theory-based
analysis of the integration and citizenship programs in each of the two case countries.
Two authors are central to my theoretical analysis. The first theories of integration are
advanced by Stephen Castles in his book Ethnicity and Globalization.54 Additional
theories are introduced by Robert Waters in his book Ethnic Minorities and the Criminal
Justice System.55
Stephen Castles advances one additional redefinition of the relationship between
the state and the individual in his definition of multicultural citizenship as “a system of
rights and obligations which protects the integrity of the individual while recognizing that
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individuality is formed in a variety of social and cultural contexts.”56 Multicultural
citizenship seems to parallel James Rosenau’s definition of democratic citizenship,
though Castles’ definition is more sensitive to the specificities of migrant and minority
cultures in the modern state system.57 Castles also approaches the difficult problems of
integration, and his theories inform the interpretations of the case studies in the later
chapters of the thesis. He outlines three “ideal models” for the integration of immigrant
communities in Western culture: “differential exclusion, assimilation, and pluralism.”58
The first, and perhaps most important is “differential exclusion,” or “a situation in
which immigrants are incorporated into certain areas of society (above all the labour
market) but denied access to others (such as welfare systems, citizenship and political
participation).”59 Furthermore, he clarifies differential exclusion in the legal realm by
noting that “Exclusion may be effected through legal mechanisms (refusal of
naturalization and sharp distinctions between the rights of citizens and non-citizens) or
through informal practices (racism and discrimination). Immigrants become ethnic
minorities, which are excluded from full participation in society.”60 The distinction
between legal and informal mechanisms of exclusion is vital to the present thesis, as the
legal obstacles Castles mentions will be central to the discussion of the case studies.
Castles’ second model for integration is assimilation, which he identifies in the
short-term as:
The policy of incorporating migrants into society through a one-sided process of
adaptation: immigrants are expected to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural
or social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority
population. Immigrants can become citizens only if they give up their group
identity.61
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Castles also identifies a specific long-term “integration” goal in many European countries
which places an emphasis on gradual rather than immediate assimilation, though the
emphasis on the shedding of cultural identities is the same.62 Castles highlights the
importance of a colonial history on the emergence of policies of assimilation in countries
like Great Britain, and notes that “ideas on citizenship, civil rights and political
participation” are tied to a larger image of cultural belonging and the perception of a
“common culture.”63
A third model for integration, labeled “pluralism,” is often a result of government
realizations that assimilation models were not effective in encouraging a sustainable
diverse population.64 Upon legal acceptance into society through immigration, Castles
argues that pluralistic communities accept:
Immigrant populations as ethnic communities which remain distinguishable from
the majority population with regard to language, culture and social
organization...Pluralism implies that immigrants should be granted equal rights in
all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their diversity...with an
expectation of conformity to certain key values.65
Though pluralism is understood to be a single model which maintains the diversity of
immigrant communities, pluralistic polices are not always uniform, as different levels of
assistance for the maintenance of cultural practices exists in various case studies.66
The second important author who contributes theoretical models of integration to
my analysis of case studies is Robert Waters. Though he approaches the theme of
immigrant communities and ethnic minorities from the more narrow perspective of the
criminal justice system, he offers several conceptual models for understanding the
adjustment process that occurs as immigrant communities are accepted into larger
society.67 Waters maintains the theoretical assimilation and pluralism models used by
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Castles, though he includes a specific model for “integration,” in which minority
communities build cultural enclaves within the larger society, “at the price of having an
‘exclusive’ boundary placed around it...by the majority group.”68 In his model for
pluralism, Waters highlights the possibility of “belonging” and “dual membership to both
the majority and the minority groups” in a number of economic and social rights areas.69
Notably, neither Waters nor Castles introduces a separate model for reciprocal
pluralism, in which both the majority and minority contribute to national identity
formation. Castles’ active definition of pluralism, in which “explicit multicultural
policies...imply the willingness of the majority group to accept cultural difference, and to
adapt national identity and institutional structures,” comes close, but it says very little
about the combined expectations of encouraging cultural difference while maintaining the
cornerstones of the majority’s political heritage.70 Indeed, both authors seem to dismiss
the importance of cultural adaptation and redefinition that happens naturally in dynamic
societies, and there seems to be a lack of theoretical “middle ground” between the
maintenance of cultural diversity and majority institutions.
This absence of a middle ground between assimilation and pluralism is
particularly problematic where minority and hybrid communities in the case studies are
concerned. Assimilation and pluralism in their ideal forms rarely, if ever, exist in
democratic societies. Legislation based entirely on assimilation runs the risk of denying
minorities basic human rights. At the same time, a wholly pluralistic polity risks crippling
itself and its institutions through the adoption of too many legal codes. In many cases, the
result of using such ideal types as models for legislation is the creation of imperfectly
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supported hybrid communities who feel no real obligations of citizenship. The problem
of legal pluralism continues to challenge legislators, scholars, and citizens.

VI. LEGAL PLURALISM
Without an acceptable theoretical definition of pluralism, the problem of
negotiating difference within a state’s legal structures becomes even more difficult. Using
Castles’ and Waters’ definitions, Western legal systems could entirely exclude minority
practices, or be consumed by them. Within the spectrum of pluralism, state legislators run
the risk of handicapping their own systems of law and democracy by introducing a
variety of autonomous cultural systems, or they risk alienating minority communities
through their unfamiliarity with diverse practices. Benhabib captures the difficulty
between valuing universally championed “rights” on one hand, and valuing an organized
and effective polity that can enforce these rights on the other. She writes that
“universalists and cosmopolitans judge the closed-door policies of the wealthy nations of
Europe and North America to be forms of organized hypocrisy” while “decline-ofcitizenship theorists point to values such as the rule of law, a vibrant civic culture, and
active citizenship, which are equally important.”71 In the difficult balance between
assimilation and pluralism, the law seems to offer few answers, though legal scholars
continue to search for adequate integration models.
Two of the most comprehensive resources I have found on legal pluralism are
Werner Menski’s Comparative Law in a Global Context and Prakash Shah’s Legal
Pluralism in Conflict.72 Menski notes that “globalization appears to have created hybrid
results rather than uniformity, leading in political science terms to a bifurcated,
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multicentric world,” and that “enlightened universalism...must mean and involve intrinsic
respect for plurality and diversity.”73 In light of globalization’s impacts and the debates
over pluralism in Western societies, Menski argues that in law, some pluralism is
unavoidable, and must be approached from “a radical view of equity as a foundation for
ultimate equality...finding justice from case to case over rigid adherence to precedent.”74
Menski argues for a social science approach to law, and advocates Masaji Chiba’s
“tripartite model of law” as a way to understand universal, Western, and other official
legal systems “as interacting with unofficial laws and legal postulates. None of these
elements ever exists in isolation; they continuously interact in dynamic fashion. Law,
thus, is always plural.”75 This approach to legal systems suggests that “law,” even if
official can never be wholly separated from identity, nor can it remain static in the face of
difference. Menski also introduces Chiba’s concept of the “identity postulate of a legal
culture, which guides a people in choosing how to reformulate the whole structure of
their law...in order to maintain their accommodation to changing circumstances.”76 This
concept of ‘identity postulates’ is a valuable theory for understanding the possibility of
legal pluralism in Western societies, in part because it suggests that Western systems of
governance and diverse individuals are already equipped to manage difference.
Prakash Shah brings Chiba’s concept of the identity postulate into the context of
state sovereignty and British law.77 He notes that “competition between different
postulates, whether in space or in theory, is unavoidable, and...these postulates must
reach accommodation or integration under a more inclusive one.”78 Shah complicates
Chiba’s definitions of pluralism, however, by reintroducing the concept of state
sovereignty and seeking an “identity postulate” in the case of a Western legal system
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“which faces the inescapable fact of the transplantation of ‘foreign’ legal cultures on the
soil over which it seeks to assert territorial jurisdiction.”79 Shah argues that in the British
case, immigration law and “race relations law” are “the chief elements of the...strategy
for coping with legal pluralism.”80 As this thesis will argue, the use of immigration and
integration legislation to “cope with” or resist pluralism is not unique to Great Britain,
and the possibility of pluralism is greatly complicated by the modern state system. A
balanced model between assimilation and pluralism could nurture both plural legal
frames of reference and maintain the strength of democratic state systems.
A unique contrast to Menski and Shah’s arguments is provided by Peter Singer.
Though Menski and Shah seem to reject a universalist view of international law, Singer
offers the philosophical, rather than legal view, that it is not useful to become tangled in
discussions about moral relativism and “cultural imperialism.”81 Singer suggests instead
that these discussions should be framed in a way that “allows for the possibility of moral
argument beyond the boundaries of one’s own culture.”82 Singer argues that such
universal discussions are essential to the development of global ethical principles for a
that are “sound, defensible, and justifiable,” while still being sensitive to and informed by
a diversity of cultures and opinions.83 Furthermore, he notes that “some aspects of ethics
can fairly be claimed to be universal, or very nearly so,” and these can aid in the creation
of guidelines for state participation in an international community.84 The creation of
global respect for “one law,” as he calls it, is only one dimension of global change
necessary in an effort to “respond ethically to the idea that we live in one world.”85 While
Menski and Shah’s theoretical models approach the problem of difference from within
state legal structures, Singer argues for the creation of a larger law that goes beyond the
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capacity and reach of states. Singer’s theories are valid in supporting the creation of a
stronger European Union citizenship to supplement state citizenship.

VII. CONCLUSION
The growth of significant ethnic minority populations in both Great Britain and
the Netherlands as a result of globalization raises several significant questions about both
the integration of difference and the state system itself. The literature and theories
identified here inform the analysis of the two case studies presented in the thesis. In
summary, the literature on the state, citizenship, and globalization suggests a changed
role for the state in maintaining its relationship with its citizens. Globalization has
transformed state populations, but the state remains the primary guarantor of democratic
rights associated with citizenship. The literature on integration models and legal
pluralism suggest an unclear path for the state as it navigates its new responsibilities.
Torn between ideal models for assimilation and pluralism, and faced with growing hybrid
communities, states are left with legal structures that offer little hope for integrating
highly diverse populations into common practices of citizenship.
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CHAPTER 3
CASE STUDY REVIEW: AN EVALUATION OF IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

I. INTRODUCTION
Where the United Kingdom is concerned, Roger Ballard writes, “What is
clear…is that the United Kingdom is by definition a multi-national society, even if it is
one within which the English have long enjoyed a position of…unquestioned
hegemony.”86 Despite a long history of multicultural and global exchange, heated debates
about cultural pluralism and British identity are central to political and academic research
in the UK today. The present historical moment demands a new approach from Great
Britain—perhaps not all that different from the American project of “the great melting
pot” envisioned so long ago. Unlike the United States, however, Great Britain is only
now being forced to confront the changing cultural and ethnic makeup of its democratic
society. Minority communities of varying generations have sought to redefine their own
cultures in order to form “hybrids” with British traditions, and have succeeded to varying
degrees. In some cases, members of minority groups are appreciated as an actively
involved part of the British population. In other cases, particularly those that spark
hostility in the national media, minority groups have difficulty meeting the expectations
of British society.
Britain’s minorities are not the only communities undergoing change. Great
Britain has also tried to define itself as a multicultural polity. Immediately following the
independence movements of many British colonies, Great Britain had relatively liberal
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immigration and integration policies, though these shifted as minorities became less
inclined to adopt British traditions and practices. In an effort to protect national
institutions, traditions, language, and identity, the British government turned to
immigration and integration legislation to limit the influx of migration. Unfortunately, the
attempt to rigidly define national British identity through legal standards limits the
successful cultural, ethnic, and civic integration of minorities, and the challenges
continue to increase as globalization further diversifies the British population.
According to the BBC and official estimated statistics, the year 2006 brought
record highs in immigration and emigration to the UK.87 Over 591,000 individuals
crossed UK borders to stay for a year or more in a wave of immigration that was offset
only by an exodus of around 400,000 individuals.88 Government statistics reveal that
343,000 (over half) of the incoming immigrants were non-British or non-European.89 In
stark contrast to such diverse immigration, the BBC notes that “just over half of those
leaving were British.”90 The BBC notes several patterns, the first of which is that
“Because so many people emigrated the rate of population growth has been the lowest for
three years.”91 Secondly, they note that these statistics illustrate a larger “pattern of longterm massive movements of people in and out of the UK.” Neither the BBC nor the
British government is quite sure what to make of these statistics. While the article reveals
a tendency to push legislation limiting non-European immigration, it also quotes a
government official who argues that:
No-one has a real grasp of where or for how long migrants are settling...The speed
and scale of migration combined with the shortcomings of official population
figures is placing pressure on funding for services...This can even lead to
unnecessary tension and conflict.92
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Regardless of their clarity, such statistics and their reflection of societal conditions have a
tangible impact on the legislation and official responses to the reception of non-European
immigrants in Great Britain. Without a clear idea of what common services are needed,
or even what problems exist with the current minority population, it is difficult for the
British government to support a multicultural community democratically. Furthermore, if
minorities are unable or unaware of the resources available to them, or if they feel they
cannot participate in democratic life effectively, they may quickly feel disenfranchised,
and be an increasing problem for the British population and government.
The quoted statistics illustrate only the most recent example of a longer trend of
globalized migration that has increased rapidly over the past few decades. Despite a long
history of migration, and a collection of increasingly restrictive legislation measures,
Great Britain seems no closer to managing its non-European migration than it was ten
years ago. As this case study will illustrate, Great Britain’s population has become
globalized, but its immigration and integration laws have not followed suit. The UK is
already home to a large and diverse ethnic minority population, and British legislation
seeks to manage this population by closing its doors, rather than by focusing on
integration through strengthening its democratic processes. As this chapter will argue,
Britain has articulated a policy of assimilation through its strict immigration and
integration controls. Though immigration policies apply to non-citizens and nonresidents, Britain’s policies have not been combined with either integration or pluralistic
policies for already existing communities. The result is a growing migrant community
that is partly “forced” to be hybrid, without adequate support structures that could
increase respect for the British political system. Those minorities who are given
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citizenship rights are rarely taught the value of democratic participation, and state
legislation directed at bridging racial or ethnic divides has been limited or inconsistent.
The greater portion of this chapter will focus on Great Britain’s immigration policies as
the clearest illustration of strict integration rhetoric, along with a brief discussion of
attempts at pluralism through race relations will also be included.
This chapter will begin with an outline of the multicultural and ethnic minority
presence in the United Kingdom. A second section will explore the historic foundations
of state-created legal obstacles to their immigration and citizenship. The third section will
review the most recent government perspectives on immigration. A final section will
reflect on the absence of consistent integration policies with respect to an existing ethnic
minority population, and will discuss the implications of British immigration legislation
for this community.

II. HISTORY OF MULTICULTURALISM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The Institute for Public Policy Research estimates that 678,000 individuals born
outside of the United Kingdom call London home.93 Even with the existence of diverse
cities like London, and statistics which suggest a non-White ethnic minority presence of
almost 8% across the whole of the United Kingdom, the struggle to welcome difference
is still very real for politicians and policymakers. The problem is shouldered both by
minority citizens themselves, as well as by the British government. Minorities and British
politicians are equally frustrated by the apparent disconnect that separates them. The
British government feels threatened by radical and fundamentalist members of minority
religious groups, and minority groups feel equally threatened by British demands that
they adopt cultural and educational traditions divergent from their own. Some minority
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groups have become relatively integrated into society, while others prefer to remain in
isolated cultural enclaves. In either case, Great Britain as a whole continues to struggle
with a changing political and societal community that is managed imperfectly by
immigration and integration legislation.
As a result of Britain’s colonial past, the issue of migration and citizenship has
almost always been a prominent one in British legislation. As Randall Hansen notes, “at
the empire’s peak in the twentieth century some 600 000 000 individuals had the
technical right to enter the UK and avail themselves of all the rights now associated with
British citizenship.”94 Though small groups of minority communities existed before the
1940s, much of the significant immigration occurred under the 1948 British Nationality
Act, which still maintained the rights of colonial subjects to enter the UK freely.95 From
1948 until 1962, the existing British Nationality Act supported the entrance of over
500,000 non-white British subjects from the Commonwealth.
As ethnic minority communities grew, they were recognized as the foundations of
a multicultural society. Throughout the 1950s, however, the liberal British perspective on
the freedoms of Commonwealth subjects began to change.96 Legislation in 1962
increased immigration controls and discouraged non-white migrants seeking entry to the
UK.97 Though a variety of legal developments now discourage multicultural migration,
Great Britain has not been able to neglect its significant multicultural community.
European migration has also played a role in the development of an ethnic minority
presence, while migration from New Commonwealth countries in the West Indies, the
Indian subcontinent, and East Africa solidify Britain’s status as a multicultural polity.98
As Hansen notes, the predominantly non-white immigration from ‘new’ Commonwealth
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countries peaked in the 1960s. Legislation responding to the growth of the minority
presence also became more obvious at this point in Britain’s history.99
Despite legislative changes that continue today, Britain’s multicultural
community continues to grow both in size and diversity. According to the 2001 Census,
half of the UK’s non-white ethnic minority population is of Indian, Pakistani, or
Bangladeshi origin.100 This amounts to over 3 percent of the UK’s total population.
Additionally, just under two percent of the total population, or around 25 percent of the
ethnic minority population, represents black Caribbean and black African
communities.101 Individuals with mixed ethnic identity represent 1.2 percent of Great
Britain’s total population, and account for approximately 15 percent of the ethnic
minority presence in the UK.102 As current events and security concerns prompt worries
over a diversifying population, Britain’s policy makers and academics continue to
struggle with the subject of ethnicity in law. The current failure to accommodate
difference and define a dynamic British identity suggests that the UK, like other
European nations, is finding it difficult to navigate a road towards pluralism.

III. LEGAL OBSTACLES
In order to better evaluate the history of immigration and the ethnic minority
presence in the UK, several pieces of British legislation beginning with the 1962
Commonwealth Immigrants Act will be discussed here. While the entirety of British
immigration legislation cannot be included, I have attempted to select and review legal
examples which have had a wide-reaching impact on the nature of British responses to
multi-ethnic citizenship. Each piece of legislation was passed in response to a perceived
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need on the part of the British populace to protect its borders or define its community,
sometimes with legitimate cause. As decades have passed however, globalization has
influenced the growth of a thriving hybrid cultural population which has not been
adequately nurtured by British legislators.

1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act
The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act marked the first time that immigration
and nationality legislation defined British nationality in terms of United Kingdom
residency and ‘belonging,’ rather than by official citizenship and passport possession.103
The Act was the beginning of Britain’s efforts to define its identity in the post-colonial
era. For the British, redefining their nationality and immigration legislation was one way
to separate their democratic institutions and national personality from the newly
independent colonies. It also had the practical advantage, from the British perspective, of
securing British territorial boundaries against a potential influx of colonial migrants.
Within the historical context, then, the legislative changes can be seen has territorially
and practically sensible. In many ways, Great Britain’s legislation at this time mirrors the
post-colonial independence movements—though the British themselves are seeking to
define their own identity and independence in the absence of their colonies.
While the practical implications of the Act for the British were no doubt positive
overall, the impact of the Act viewed retrospectively and through the close lens of
globalization offers a different picture. While labor was widely solicited during the
colonial period, the 1962 Act changed the face of British immigration by introducing a
system of labor vouchers which policed the entry of unskilled workers.104 Furthermore, as
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Randall Hansen writes, the most important impact of the 1962 legislation was to deny
“millions of largely non-white ‘colonial’ British subjects across the globe” the rights and
opportunities normally associated with British nationality.105 The 1962 Act was the first
of many changes which would radically redefine British immigration and integration law.
It is also the first Act which began to devalue British citizenship and identity for a
significant portion of Great Britain’s colonial citizens.

1971 Immigration Act
The second significant change in British legislation was the 1971 Immigration
Act. The 1971 Immigration Act officially codified the earlier Acts in the 1960s, and
introduced a system of Immigration “Rules” that, though not legislation, could be used as
legal guidance for the arbitrary administration of the Act.106 Though the substance of the
legislation had not changed significantly from 1962 until 1971, the national perception of
minorities had, and this is reflected in the official language of the Act. Both the British
population and their leaders in government began to realize that a sizable population of
minorities was intent on making Great Britain their permanent home. Though the
migratory numbers were smaller than they are today, the 1970s represent a mindset shift
from simply managing migration to almost entirely closing the doors, particularly where
minorities from previous colonies were concerned.
The 1971 Act had the most serious consequences for Commonwealth subjects
seeking entry into the UK. While the 1962 Act established the recognition of differences
between passports issued under UK central authorities and those issued by colonial
offices, the 1971 Act reinforced these differences through a new concept known as
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‘patriality.’107 Beginning with the 1971 Act, Commonwealth subjects seeking entry
clearance to the UK needed to prove that either they or their parents or grandparents were
born on UK soil.108 In short, the 1971 Act had the permanent effect of placing
“Commonwealth citizens on the same legal footing as aliens for the purposes of
immigration.”109 The 1971 Act further stripped away the “rights” associated with
citizenship in the eyes of growing minority communities from the colonies.
For many Commonwealth subjects from former British colonies in Africa, the
impact of the 1971 Act was particularly acute. Indeed, the 1971 Act was initially
conceived as a way to quell the official and public resistance to the possibility of mass
immigration of Kenyan Asians with British nationality to the United Kingdom following
Africanization policies in Kenya.110 Nuruddin Farah also notes that opposition to African
migration was later repeated when the British Nationality Act of 1981 was passed in
response to the immigration of Ugandan Asians following their expulsion from Uganda
under Idi Amin’s rule.111 Though the 1971 Act was not a direct result of the Ugandan
crisis which occurred in 1972, Ugandan Asians, many of whom also held British
passports, were either accepted into the UK as refugees or were turned away if they could
not prove patriality under the stringent provisions of the 1971 Act.112 Nonetheless, the
1971 Act had obvious implications for Commonwealth citizens seeking protection from
their governments, particularly in cases where independence movements brought civil
unrest and governmental instability.
From the perspective of the Commonwealth, the 1971 legislation meant an
oppressive immigration regime which closed the doors of British legal rights to anyone
who could not prove patrial family lineage, UK birth, or a five year residence permitted
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by labor vouchers.113 In contrast, Great Britain may also have viewed the 1971 Act as a
way to prepare itself for the arrival of European migrants upon its entry into the European
Union in 1973. As Sanjiv Sachdeva notes, the 1971 Act reflected a move toward
European Economic Community provisions which gave European citizens primacy over
that of the colonial states.114 Britain’s efforts to meet the demands of European Union
membership are not enough, however, to excuse the global implications of the 1971 Act.
As Nuruddin Farah writes, the 1971 Act had a clearly “racist logic” underneath it—a
logic that meant “one was treated differently if one came from what was referred to as the
Old Commonwealth...Ready to join...the European Community, Britain has lately
negotiated away its imperial responsibility.”115 Whether the 1971 Immigration Act is a
matter of Britain’s successful European integration or one of post-colonial
irresponsibility, the atmosphere of exclusion it has created for Commonwealth and
minority immigrants continues to exist today.

The Primary Purpose Rule: A Bridge Between Decades
One of the most controversial, yet relatively unstudied, legal developments in
British immigration legislation is the Primary Purpose Rule.116 As Andrew Geddes
writes, this rule was created by conservative political leaders in 1980 as a way to give
“immigration authorities the power to prove the ‘real’ status and reasons for an
application to enter the UK for purposes of marriage.”117 This rule is important to the
present study because it illustrates the shift between viewing colonial migrants as a
territorial challenge to that of a cultural or ethnic one, even if this challenge was more
one of perception than reality. Following the end of legitimate labor migration, the
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British government saw a massive increase in the number of secondary migrants seeking
visas as spouses or family members of UK residents, and legislation during this time
period sought to control this influx.118 Earlier British legislation that sought to limit
immigration was “based on the assumption that men were the breadwinners and women
were dependants who would follow their husbands.”119 The primary purpose legislation
grew out of legal challenges by the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled that
British legislation was discriminating based on sex.120
Through the Primary Purpose Rule, the British government sought to limit the
entry of individuals, regardless of gender, whose marriages were based on labor or
economic incentives.121 The Rule was removed from British legislation in 1997,
following a change of government, though its effects were certainly felt during the two
decades of its existence.122 Minority families were hit particularly hard, with little
protection from British law. As Geddes argues, “There was no constitutional protection
of the rights of the family” in the United Kingdom “because there is not a formal, written
UK constitution. Family migration was provided for by statute.”123 Sanjiv Sachdeva
argues that the Rule was indicative of a larger trend in British immigration legislation that
targeted minority communities, writing:
British Immigration control, in the cleft stick between upholding basic human
rights and protecting the legitimate concerns of a national interest, has quite
apparently yet to learn that public interest in Britain now includes the concerns of
the various non-white and non-English minorities.124
Indeed, the Primary Purpose Rule was a small glimpse into the increasingly restrictive
immigration legislation that would permanently redefine British citizenship for postcolonial minorities in the 1980s.
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1981 Nationality Act
Perhaps the most important recent legal development after the 1962
Commonwealth Immigrants Act is the British Nationality Act of 1981. The 1981 Act
radically redefined the legislation surrounding nationality and citizenship in the UK and
the Commonwealth. Its most important effect was to replace the more liberal 1948 British
Nationality Act with three new types of citizenship that made permanent distinctions
between full British (or patrial) citizenship, British Dependent Territories Citizenship,
and British Overseas Citizenship.125 As Andrew Geddes writes, the creation of official
British Overseas Citizenship (or BOC) stripped Commonwealth citizens in East Africa of
any rights associated with their ties to the British.126 For the countless individuals who
had once been considered British nationals under colonial rule, the 1981 legislation
meant that their British ‘citizenship’ no longer had any rights associated with it.127 In the
end, even the strictest legislation embodied by the 1981 Act could not completely close
Britain’s doors to the flow of family members and asylum seekers who would cross its
borders in the decades to follow the new Nationality Act.

Legislation from 1993 to Today
While the challenges regarding the immigration of British Overseas Citizens have
not disappeared altogether, more modern attempts to control immigration have centered
on the control of asylum applications. The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act,
the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act, and four additional Acts on immigration and
asylum between 1999 and 2006 are the most recent attempts to manage immigration in
the UK. While the impact of the earlier Acts can be evaluated, the scholarly research on
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the most recent Acts is limited. The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act was the
first to respond to massive increases in immigration during the period from 1989-1993.
The first impact of this Act was to introduce a body of legislation that dealt specifically
with “the backlog of asylum cases” that confronted UK officials in the early 1990s.128
The legislation limited not only the number of asylum-seekers who were given official
refugee status, but also withdrew the government provisions of housing for asylumseekers.129 The 1993 Act did not officially have an impact on the number of applications
for asylum overall—indeed the applications continued to rise dramatically after 1993.130
Contrary to its intent, the 1993 Act had the impact of increased refusals and a decrease in
the numbers of asylum-seekers given Exceptional Leave to Remain, or ELR. As a Home
Office report notes, “In 1993, 48 per cent of initial decisions were to grant ELR and 46
per cent were refused asylum. In 1995, 16 percent were granted ELR while 79 per cent
were refused.”131
The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 also sought to limit asylum
applications by denying many asylum seekers welfare and housing benefits, and the
absence of government efforts to remedy the social and economic deprivation that
plagued the majority of asylum communities placed crushing responsibility on local
organizations which developed temporary, improvised, and un-coordinated solutions to
widespread problems.132 Additionally, the 1996 Act removed the right of appeal within
the UK for asylum-seekers who first traveled through another country considered “safe”
by immigration officials before arriving in the UK.133 Overall, as Andrew Geddes
observes, each new asylum Act passed between 1993 and today has “sought to correct the
errors of the previous legislation.”134 The result, in the end, is a collection of asylum
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legislation which seeks both to close off external borders and build more complicated
internal measures for discouraging asylum applications.135 Despite a legacy of tough
legislation, however, the newest legislation passed in 2002 may hold some promise for a
successfully multicultural Britain. The 2002 legislation in particular began to seek out
alternative routes to “positive immigration” in the form of the Highly Skilled Migrants
Program, and increased attention to anti-discrimination legislation may also encourage
new approaches to pluralism in the UK.136 Despite moderate improvements, the most
recent programs for ‘managing migration’ may be a step in the wrong direction.

IV. A FIVE YEAR PLAN FOR MANAGING MIGRATION
In 2005, the British government articulated the newest of its policies for
managing immigration in a report entitled “Controlling our borders: Making migration
work for Britain.”137 The report outlined a five-year plan for the standardization of the
British immigration program through a “points-based scheme...to ensure all those settling
permanently in the UK bring a long term benefit.”138 The proposal has not been affirmed
by legislation, but it seeks to replace a system of Immigration Rules which has been
pieced together through over 50 legislative changes since 1994.139 The proposed reforms
would simplify the mass of Immigration Rules, like the Primary Purpose Rule discussed
earlier. According to the government, the reforms seek to address three central problems
with the old legislation: 1) the inconsistency of Immigration Rule application in cases of
beneficial migrants, 2) “complex, subjective and bureaucratic processes,” and 3) abuse of
migration policies.140 The new legislation combines a desire on the part of the British
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government to streamline the immigration process, as well as reduce the number of
individuals who take advantage of the currently disorganized system.
In order to meet these goals, the government’s plans outline a new five-tier
system for managing migration and settlement in the United Kingdom. These tiers are
supported by a “points” system in which applicants are gauged based on predictions
about “a migrant’s success in the labour market...and control factors (which relate to
whether someone is likely to comply with the conditions of their leave).”141 The system
for evaluation is primarily economic, and seeks to identify fairly those migrants “who
will increase the skills and knowledge-base of the UK...invest capital or in their
education,” or otherwise contribute to the British economy.142 Very little reference is
made to cultural capital, though the report notes that the new system will work to invite
individuals “who will enrich UK society by their presence and act as ambassadors for the
UK on their return home.”143 In many ways, Britain’s legislation adequately supports the
highly-skilled participation of economic citizens, but does little to support their cultural
and political needs.
The five-tier system is broken down into categories of permanent and temporary
migration. The first two categories deal with permanent migration, and include “highly
skilled individuals” who can “contribute to growth and productivity in the UK” (Tier 1)
or “skilled workers with a job offer to fill gaps in the UK labour force” (Tier 2).144 The
remaining three tiers, in which applicants are assumed to “return home at the end of their
stay” include “low skilled workers needed to fill specific temporary labour shortages,”
students, and other temporary workers (Tiers 3, 4, and 5). A system of points, awarded
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differently from tier to tier, includes criteria ranging from predicted contributions to the
UK economy to general qualifications and English language ability.145
Where permanent migration and settlement is concerned, the initial report of 2005
outlines three categories of acceptable migrants: “certain skilled workers...genuine
refugees,” and the immediate families of British citizens.146 The report also notes that
“Permanent migrants must be as economically active as possible; put as little burden on
the state as possible; and be as socially integrated as possible.”147 Overall, the collection
of literature on the most modern migration and immigration legislation seeks to put in
place a system of regulations that limits migration to economically advantageous
individuals who can integrate into mainstream British society quickly and easily. The
definition of “British society” is made unclear by the country’s limited support of its
large multicultural population.

V. A HAPHAZARD APPROACH TO A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY
The efforts to standardize Britain’s immigration legislation are a positive
development, as they represent an official response to the inconsistencies and prejudices
supported by the historical Immigration Rules system. As the wider statistics and history
of immigration illustrate, however, the United Kingdom has become an increasingly
multicultural polity. Andrew Geddes notes that increasingly restrictive immigration
legislation from the 1960s to 1980s was balanced by domestic “anti-discrimination
legislation” in the form of “three ‘race relations’ acts of 1965, 1968, and 1976” designed
to prevent racial and ethnic discrimination.148 Over the past two decades, however,
Britain has done little to integrate its multicultural community through legal channels.
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Bhikhu Parekh, the chair of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic
Britain, argues that “The very language used to describe and define race relations in
Britain is a source of considerable conceptual and political muddle.”149 The Race
Relations Act of 1976 has been added to only through a series of amendments in 2000,
though the independent Commission led by Parekh argues that “In the longer
term...amendments are not enough. A new Equality Act is required, together with a new
Equality Commission.”150 In addition, Parekh’s report calls for a greater commitment to
Britain’s obligations to human rights, and for the UK to “formally declare itself...a
multicultural state.”151 In the absence of such organized commitments to its multicultural
population, however, a variety of legal conflicts arise—one of which will be discussed
here as a brief example.
In the United Kingdom, conflicts of cultural norms in law are resolved through an
unsure reliance on British legal norms. A recent High Court case in 2000, labeled “the
case of the missing pound,” is one such conflict in which British law finds a way to work
around the pluralities of Muslim law.152 In the example of this case, Ali v. Ali, the High
Court judge was asked to enforce conditions of a contract entered into under Muslim law
between a couple seeking a divorce under English law.153 Under Muslim law, the wife
would receive £30,001, while under English law she would have received very little
financial support.154 Rather than apply Muslim law, the High Court judge gave the
woman £30,000— £1 less—invoking the English law of equity.155 This case is
particularly interesting as a result of two outcomes. First, the divorced woman is treated
fairly, while English law remains insulated “from the unrelenting pressure to accept
personal laws, such as that of the Muslims, as part of the new British legal
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framework.”156 The details of the case are less important than the precedent it sets with
regard to multicultural relations in the United Kingdom.
This brief relation of Ali v. Ali is rather simplified, but the case as a whole
represents one of many cases in which resistance against non-English norms seeks to
avoid the “collective disposition” or “transient pluralities” of cultural difference. A
homogenous population is theoretically more manageable, particularly where law is
concerned, as the Ali v. Ali case illustrates. Great Britain fails to realize, however, that
much of its law could protect minorities and their cultures without destroying itself. Great
Britain’s primary difficulty may be a lack of standardization, particularly where respect
for multicultural citizens are concerned. As a result, British legal decisions are
inconsistent—occasionally they protect cultural rights, but often they do not. In the midst
of diverse decisions, no strong legal precedent or legislation exists which sets the
standard for minority and hybrid citizenship in Great Britain.

VI. CONCLUSION
There is little question that minority communities must shoulder the burden of
citizenship when they choose to emigrate—this has historically been the case, and there is
little chance of the norm drastically changing in the future. Nonetheless, the pressures
that have influenced such dramatic changes in Great Britain’s legislation illustrate the
challenges of managing a growing multicultural population. In the same moment, a
review of Great Britain’s immigration and integration methods shows imperfect
protections for hybrid communities seeking to understand the value and dynamic
potential of citizenship over a longer history. If Great Britain is committed to truly
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democratic processes and the protection of its citizens’ interests, cosmopolitan citizens
cannot be excluded. Great Britain continues to have several ways forward in its efforts to
negotiate its own “melting pot” and globalized society.
I argue that the British ‘phenomenon’ of a multi-ethnic society could potentially
be evaluated through three lenses. First, it can be interpreted through the narrow lens of
Hobbesian state sovereignty, in which a series of strict immigration policies illustrate an
expectation of assimilation on the part of multicultural communities. This perspective
often creates animosity among globalized citizens who are making significant efforts to
integrate into a new community. Second, it can be analyzed from the equally strict
perspective of pluralism. From this perspective, Great Britain’s attempts at controlling
migration and its failure to adopt a diversity of legal and cultural structures limit
successful integration and pluralism. Furthermore, pluralism is a difficult philosophy to
live out in reality—particularly when cultural differences emerge so clearly at the ends of
fundamentalist spectrums. Neither the assimilationist nor the pluralist perspective seems
successful in balancing a multi-ethnic democracy in which the burden of citizenship and
statehood is shared across cultural boundaries.
A third perspective is perhaps best defined through the lens of globalization—
which keeps both state sovereignty and global interdependence in view. Through this
third perspective, it is possible to see British immigration legislation in a period of
transition as it navigates the new challenges of democracy in an age of globalization.
Keeping the reality of the British example in mind, it seems that the last lens is
the most useful. Much of the theoretical literature on models for pluralism has focused on
a world beyond sovereignty in which borders should not or do not exist, while little has
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been written as a way to bridge the gap between the old world of states and the new
unknown. A lens of globalization allows for analysis which recognizes the strength of
state borders, but also the increasing potency of multicultural communities. Under the
criteria of the last lens, the British immigration legislation still falls far short of ideal
under conditions of globalization. It seeks to maintain its territorial sovereignty, but
defines an unmanageable integration rhetoric in the process. Under the interdependence
conditions of globalization, states must include multicultural societies within the
legislative umbrellas of their sovereign social contract.
Building strong economic citizens is not enough to maintain the democratic
process, as the new Five Year Plan attempts to do. Multi-ethnic citizens must understand
the value of the democratic process, and have consistent access to the protections it
provides. Without significant legislative changes to support cultural diversity within its
borders, Britain can never hope to democratically navigate a world of globalization which
thrives on interdependence and diversity. At the same time, minority citizens must
continue to do the difficult work of searching for their own identity in a globalized world.
They can bring a wealth of new cultural practices to the British population, but they also
must work to preserve a political and social environment where such diversity can be
respected in the long-term.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDY REVIEW: CHALLENGES OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS

I. INTRODUCTION
The Netherlands has historically been recognized as highly accommodating and
supportive of its minority communities. Dutch immigration policies were relatively
liberal, until recent changes transformed the nation from a European model to a more
characteristic ‘muddle.’ The earliest stages of Dutch pluralism show a unique legal
respect for pluralism and multiculturalism, and Dutch tolerance of immigrant cultures
made it an ideal host country for asylum seekers and economic migrants. Dutch policies
today are widely divergent from their counterparts two decades ago. The Dutch approach
has changed significantly as a result of economic instability, worries about national
security, and a diversifying national community. Despite these changes, Dutch
immigration and integration legislation is an essential guide for minorities as they
navigate the legal processes of citizenship and ‘belonging’ in a democratic state. Dutch
policies also represent a first introduction to democratic life, particularly for asylum
seekers and immigrants who arrive from failed or undemocratic states.
This chapter presents three central topics in an analysis of Dutch immigration and
integration legislation. The first section outlines the history of migration and
multiculturalism in the Netherlands. Migration is not a new phenomenon for the country,
nor is the growth of minority communities, and a historical backdrop provides
perspectives for the remainder of the chapter. The second section reviews the broad
changes in legislation that currently impact ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. A third
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section will discuss the most recent developments in legislation and integration and the
challenges that they present for supporting strong democratic citizens among ethnic
minority communities.

II. HISTORY OF MULTICULTURALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS
According to authors Jan Lucassen and Rinus Penninx, waves of immigration and
emigration in the Netherlands have existed for over four centuries.157 Though the
discourse and political rhetoric about these ‘newcomers’ has changed over time, the
challenges remain the same. Despite the long history of immigration in the Netherlands,
this chapter is concerned specifically with the more modern realities of newcomers in the
period following the Second World War.
Following the end of World War II, three categories of migration can be identified
in the history of the Netherlands—those migrating for political reasons, as a result of
economic factors, or as asylum seekers.158 First, the Netherlands saw an increase in
political migration that began as a result of independence movements in its colonial
territories. The first important group of migrants was from the Dutch colony in Indonesia.
Lucassen and Penninx estimate that from 1945 to 1965, around 300,000 migrants traveled
from Indonesia to settle in the Netherlands.159 Following Japan’s occupation of Indonesia
between 1942 and 1945, around 120,000 Dutch nationals escaped political persecution
and instability in order to return en masse to the Netherlands.160
In addition, these hundreds of thousands of native Dutch were joined by around
180,000 mixed Dutch-Indonesians—who were born to at least one Dutch parent, and who
chose Dutch nationality over Indonesian nationality.161 Finally, the migration of a third
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group of Moluccans resulted from political instability in Indonesia in the late 1940s.
Originally, the Moluccans served in the Netherlands Indies Army and opposed the
Indonesian government’s rule in an effort to gain Moluccan independence.162 The
Indonesian government refused to negotiate with the Moluccans, and the Netherlands
government eventually agreed to allow the temporary migration of 12,500 Moluccans to
the Netherlands.163 Initially, the Moluccans were housed in camps in the Netherlands,
forbidden to work, and were completely isolated from the larger Dutch society.164
Beginning in the 1950s, the Moluccan community numbered around 32,000, and they
were increasingly granted work opportunities and relocated to Dutch towns.165 Despite
these attempts at integration, a Moluccan terrorist group comprised of second generation
Moluccan immigrants carried out a series of attacks on Dutch soil between 1975 and
1978.166 In 1977, attacks on a Dutch train and terrorist occupation of a school led to a
forceful reaction on the part of the Dutch government to free hostages.167 Following these
attacks in 1977, Moluccan terrorism ceased, and a more successfully integrated
community of Moluccans and their descendants numbers around 40,000.168
Moluccans were joined by large numbers of Surinamese between 1973 and 1975,
when the approaching independence of Surinam threatened to bring an end to the
substantial benefits of Dutch citizenship for the Surinamese.169 Though the Charter for
the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1954 allowed the free movement of Surinamese
citizens, the expiration of this provision meant that thousands of Surinamese sought to
take advantage of their ‘last chance’ at the full rights associated with official Dutch
citizenship. In 1975 alone, the Netherlands saw almost 40,000 Surinamese cross the
Dutch border, bringing the population of Surinamese in the Netherlands to just over
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100,000.170 In the end, almost a third of the Surinamese population immigrated to the
Netherlands.171 Today, provisional data for the year 2007 estimates that over 300,000
individuals of Surinamese origin or second generation descent currently reside in the
Netherlands.172
Migration through colonial channels was extremely valuable for individuals
holding Dutch passports. The second major reason for immigration to the Netherlands
was economic. For colonial and non-colonial subjects, economic incentives encouraged
many migrants to leave their homes in search of better opportunities. Migrants were
given opportunities through government guest worker programs in the 1960s, and later by
more modern permanent economic migration.173 The first workers were recruited from
Spain and Italy, though a larger percentage arrived from Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia
during the mid-1960s. Like many other countries in Western Europe, the Dutch
government believed that these ‘guest’ workers would be resident in the Netherlands for
the short term only, and the migrants initially acted under similar sentiments.
Like other European countries at the time, the Netherlands ended its guest worker
programs in 1974, following the 1973 oil crisis, massive economic restructuring, and a
decrease in the need for foreign labor.174 Economic migration continues today, though it
is limited and accepted applicants are generally highly skilled. The complex economic
changes during the 1970s significantly transformed the demographic composition of the
minority presence in the Netherlands.175 Many of the European migrant workers recruited
during the 1960s returned to their own homes as Dutch labor opportunities declined and
their own countries improved. In contrast, large numbers of Turks and Moroccans stayed
and invited their families to the Netherlands.176 New family arrangements also became
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common in the 1990s, as it became more difficult to gain entry clearance for other
reasons. Lucassen and Penninx write that by 1992 “the Turks and Moroccans constituted
the largest groups of immigrants in the Netherlands (250,000 and 195,000 respectively)
after the Surinamese.”177 Today, the Turkish community in the Netherlands exceeds
360,000 if second generation Turkish are included.178
Migration had existed for decades, but the Netherlands began to realize quickly in
the 1970s that the ‘guest’ worker population was determined to stay. Great Britain and
the Netherlands are similar in this respect. Many of the “guests” became permanent
citizens, but few legislative efforts capitalized on their permanent contributions to
democratic society. Workers also invited their families to the Netherlands, rather than
risk losing their residence status by returning to their homes abroad. The ethnic minority
communities were imperfectly embraced in a democratic system that had never truly
‘welcomed’ diversity. When guest worker programs ended, ethnic minority communities
grew without a clear sense of their legal or cultural responsibilities to the democratic
polities they had entered. Legislators, too, were unsure of how to respond to their new
constituents.
In addition to political and economic migrants, large scale asylum applications to
the Netherlands began in 1974 following the end of official guest worker programs.
Rising trends in asylum applications began in the 1980s, with a record number of over
52,000 in 1994 alone.179 Applications have decreased dramatically since 1994, though
they increased between 2004 and 2005, when 12,350 applications for asylum were
received.180 Large populations of asylum migrants can impact ethnic minority and host
country populations in several ways. First, asylum seekers largely arrive from failed
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states or undemocratic states, or as a result of some other threat to human rights. This
reality could potentially encourage their appreciation of democratic systems, though it
complicates their understanding of such processes. Second, asylum seekers also pose a
complicated dilemma where economic value to society is concerned. Asylum seekers
who are later given citizenship or long-term residency rarely have the means to contribute
significantly to national economies. Their value to society must be recalculated using
international standards of human rights, rather than the more economically based criteria
used for immigration as a whole. Finally, asylum seekers (or new migrants more
generally) retain cultural specificities that can clash with local cultures, whether Dutch or
hybrid. Some asylum seekers may feel alienated and ostracized by the Dutch population,
and turn instead to enclaves of their national origin. The historical backgrounds of
minority communities have changed over time, however, and more ‘hybrid’ cultures
mean that even their national culture feels different.
In conclusion, the modern history of migration in the Netherlands is both dynamic
and multi-faceted. One modern report suggests that communities of non-Western
immigrants in the Netherlands are as large as 1.6 million, or ten percent of the country’s
population.181 According to the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, first and second
generation individuals with at least one parent born abroad make up 19.4% of the
population in the Netherlands.182 Each generation of migrants cites a unique memoir of
immigration experiences and the legislation surrounding these experiences. The climate
of immigration in the Netherlands may be changing yet again—influenced by the social
tension that has increased following the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in
November 2004.183 Restrictive immigration and asylum policies, and continuing debates
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over family reunion and the social integration of minority groups suggest that the history
of migration in the Netherlands is far from complete. Like the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands seeks to preserve its institutions and societal values—immigration and
integration legislation are a central method for doing so.

III. LEGAL OBSTACLES
The challenges of migration and the growth of multicultural communities in the
Netherlands parallel a changing legal regime of immigration, integration, and asylum
policies. Despite innovative commitments to more inclusive and respectful “minorities
policy” during the 1970s, modern immigration and integration policies have moved away
from a focus on multiculturalism toward a focus on civic integration, or inburgering.184
From the 1970s until today, two competing approaches have pursued divergent legal and
political solutions to the challenges of a multicultural Dutch society. Several important
legal developments will be discussed in this section.
The first approach of “minorities policy,” prevalent between the 1970s and early
1980s, was the product of pillarization, or verzuiling, which defined a political system of
“institutionalised separateness” for Dutch religious and cultural communities.185 The
recognition of separate pillars largely disappeared in the 1960s, but policies directly
affecting minority groups were influenced by the “identity-affirming” qualities of
pillarization even after the official decline of the policy.186 The Dutch pillarization policy
was recognized across Europe as a highly liberal and innovative one, and while its
effectiveness was limited, it did seek equality and freedom for many of the varied ethnic
groups in the Netherlands. The transformation from pillarization to civic integration was
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based on the recognition that many minority communities were becoming too separate
from the mainstream Dutch community, and the legislation today reflects significant
changes in mindset and expectation.

1983 Minorities Policy
Perhaps the most influential legal development reflecting the affirming approach
of this early period was the 1983 Minorities Policy. According to Andrew Geddes, this
policy “saw the Netherlands as a multi-ethnic society with the expression of ethnic
differences by immigrants an important part of their social identity, which should be
protected.”187 The policy contained three central goals which advocated the promotion of
minority equality before law, the promotion of “multiculturalism and the emancipation of
ethnic communities,” and improvements in the social and economic realities of
minorities.188
Combining legal equality with equal opportunities, the 1983 Minorities Policy
embraced a method for integration that did not require a renunciation of unique cultural
identities.189 More importantly, Dutch policies offered cultural “pillars” a clear avenue
for political participation. Dutch policies granting voting rights to residents of third
country national status after five years of legal residence make the Netherlands, to this
day, one of the few states to grant limited political participation rights to non-nationals.190
Despite concerted attempts to encourage a pluralistic minorities policy, political changes
and historical evolutions slowly began to erode the ambitious steps toward multicultural
integration taken during the 1970s and 1980s.
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Post-1983 Legislation
It is difficult to pinpoint a single year or event between the 1980s and today which
marks the official decline of the plural minorities policy, though several trends greatly
influenced the rising popularity of less multicultural integration policies. First, political
and academic statistics in the late 1980s began to reflect a growing gap of inequality and
marginalization between native Dutch and minority communities.191 As a result, political
sentiments shifted, and multiculturalism was challenged by individuals seeking to
encourage a universal commitment to “the Dutch way of life.”192 This new commitment
is illustrated most recently by the introduction of the 2006 Integration Abroad Act, and
the 2007 New Integration Act. While the 1983 Minorities Policy “explicitly safeguarded” the cultural autonomy of minorities and rejected forced assimilation, modern
policies focus on civic integration through inburgering, or integration through adaptation
and assimilation.193
Among other conditions, the New Integration Act and the Integration Abroad Act
places an obligation on individuals applying for residence status in the Netherlands to
achieve integration through an “integration programme…consisting of courses in Dutch
and social and vocational orientation, career planning, social guidance.”194 The New
Integration Act and the Integration Abroad Act follow legislation made with the 1998
Law on the Civic Integration of Newcomers, which requires “500 hours of language
training and 100 hours of civic education” in order to meet integration requirements.195
The requirements might potentially be useful in educating better citizens in a dynamic
democracy, but they are used instead to define the parameters of Dutch identity.
Minorities who participate in local and national politics have become disenchanted not
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because laws to protect them do not exist, but because they are not enforced. Jytte
Klausen writes that “Dutch Muslim leaders were particularly skeptical that more laws
would resolve anything. ‘We already have so many laws,’ several people said, ‘and none
of them are enforced.’”196 Two types of skepticism seem to exist where minority
legislation is concerned. First, many minorities do not understand the value of the
democratic process and blindly dismiss it. Second, those minorities who are deeply
invested in the democratic process have become frustrated with the difficulty of
supporting diverse communities and enforcing legislation.
The increasing size, diversity, and economic status of ethnic minority and
immigrant communities also challenged Dutch policy makers at the turn of the century.197
Several legislative changes beginning in 1984 attempted to calm the growing public
excitement over the evolving identity of Dutch minority communities. First, the
Nationality Act of 1984 presented significant challenges to newcomers seeking
naturalization. The 1984 Act followed an attempt by right-wing politicians to reduce
minority naturalization through the adoption of a bill which would have excluded
Surinamese immigrants from a “rapid naturalisation procedure…for persons who had lost
their Dutch nationality.”198 While the 1984 Act was not so openly xenophobic, two
modifications “were clearly related to the desire to restrict immigration.”199 The Act
abolished the option for non-Dutch women to choose Dutch nationality after marriage to
a Dutch citizen.200 As Groenendijk and Heijs note, this change had the effect of reducing
the number of marriages whose primary purpose was to acquire Dutch nationality—much
like the British Primary Purpose Rule.
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A second provision granting stateless children born in the Netherlands Dutch
nationality was also removed—introducing a three-year residence requirement which
would have the effect of preventing children born to stateless parents from acquiring
Dutch citizenship.201 This same rule was used to prevent stateless children’s parents from
acquiring residence status and eventual citizenship. Overall, the shift in approaches to
migration has been significant, and political and legal debates are far from over.

IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FOCUS: ASYLUM AND INTEGRATION
Two significant areas of modern legislative change currently impact minority
communities in the Netherlands. First, new asylum legislation has redefined the Dutch
perspective on immigration between 2000 and today. Second, a new integration model
has changed naturalization requirements and perceptions of Dutch identity and
democracy. Both the asylum and integration legislation help define normal or
‘acceptable’ Dutch standards for entry clearance. A more critical look at this legislation
suggests that it serves more than a “gate keeping” function. Though this is certainly part
of the equation, asylum and integration legislation serves as the ‘instruction manual’ for
Dutch democracy in migrant communities.

Modern Asylum Developments
Within this decade, the Dutch government overhauled its asylum and aliens
policies with the Aliens Act 2000. Vera Marinelli writes “The introduction of a tougher
asylum law in April 2001 led to a dramatic drop in applications. In 2004, less than
10,000 people applied for asylum in the Netherlands, a 30 per cent drop from 2003.
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This signified the lowest number of asylum applications since 1988.”202 The Act was
initially a highly effective legislative tool for closing the Netherlands’ doors. As the
government soon realized, however, the legislation would not stand without
complications. Under the old legislation, thousands of asylum seekers had waited over
five years in the Netherlands for their asylum decisions or appeals.203 The Netherlands
became a safe haven and home for many asylum seekers, though the new legislation
threatened to disrupt their legal remedies. Around 26,000 of these asylum seekers faced
deportation before their appeals were completed.204 The harsh impact of the legislation
did not go unnoticed among the Dutch public or the international community.
Two significant civil society responses to the Dutch legislation appeared
following the decision to deport the 26,000 asylum seekers. First, Dutch filmmakers and
NGOs rallied together in a project called 26,000 gezichten, or ‘26,000 faces.’ Marinelli
suggests that the widely aired and publicized media project was “designed to give a face
to the 26,000 asylum seekers” who were denied rights under new Dutch legislation.205
The project’s website argues that 8,000 is a more accurate and reasonable number of
asylum seekers facing deportation, and adds that the children of these migrants have
integrated successfully—speaking Dutch and maintaining a hybrid of their home
cultures.206 The website is not available entirely in English, though many of the videos
are subtitled from the original Dutch language. The videos available are an excellent
visual display of minority attempts to integrate into society. Additionally, the collection
of small clips seeks to illustrate the human and legal injustice of the threatened
deportations. The profiles are a reminder of the myriad assets that asylum seekers and
minorities bring to a country like the Netherlands.
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A second civil society response to Dutch legislation—this time international—
arrived in 2003 when Human Rights Watch published an extensive report claiming that
Dutch law violated “fundamental asylum and refugee rights” under international law.
When the bill to deport thousands of asylum seekers was approved by a large portion of
Dutch legislators, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also “expressed
concern” with the Dutch law.207 Following changes in government over several years and
pressure from the United Nations and European Union, the Netherlands amended its
legislation. The asylum Act still remains strict, though revisions have softened the initial
blow. The most recent provision resolved the issue of deportation for the “26,000”
asylum seekers caught between two Acts. In June 2007, a general amnesty was approved
for all asylum seekers whose applications were submitted before April 2001, and who
maintained residence and good legal standing.208
The most recent legal developments in asylum legislation in the Netherlands are
promising—particularly if asylum seekers take advantage opportunities for continued
residence. Nonetheless, the naturalization and immigration process remains difficult to
navigate. The Dutch legal handbook of citizenship offers asylum seekers and new
immigrants few guidelines for making the Netherlands “home.”

The New Integration Policies
In 2006, the Dutch government introduced requirements for a civic integration
examination to be completed by all individuals seeking long-term settlement or family
reunion.209 Asylum seekers and residents in the Netherlands are required to take a similar
integration exam if they wish to acquire citizenship. The newest legislation requires that
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certain newcomers complete this examination before they arrive in the Netherlands. In
their informational brochure, the government also notes that “Religious leaders coming to
the Netherlands for employment, such as imams or preachers, will also have to take the
civic integration examination abroad.” 210
European Union citizens, American citizens, Japanese citizens, and a handful of
other non-European states are exempt from the exam, though they are still required to
apply for residence permits. The exam requires that migrants display “basic knowledge of
both the Dutch language and Dutch society before they come to the Netherlands.”211
Migrants who are required to complete the exam must do so at a Dutch embassy after
preparing adequately. The exam costs 350euros (approximately $500US), and
preparation materials can be acquired for another 70euros (approximately $100US).212
According to the government brochure, the exam (given only in Dutch) consists of two
parts: a language section, and a society portion, which each last 15 minutes.213 Topics and
questions vary widely, despite the short nature of the exam.
The society portion of the exam is the most diverse. The brochure reveals that
questions can be asked about: “The Netherlands: living here, geography, and
transport...history...constitution, democracy, and legislation...the Dutch language and the
importance of learning it...parenting and education...health care...work and income.”214
For migrants taking the exam at an embassy abroad, the subject list is no doubt daunting.
Any of these subjects can take a lifetime to learn in their entirety, yet successful
completion of the exam is required for a residence lasting more than three months. The
Netherlands has the opportunity to build a generation of active and well-informed
multicultural citizens through its legislation. The increasing restrictions and heightened
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requirements seem to suggest that citizenship denotes acceptance into an unchanging
national community. Migrants are required to familiarize themselves with Dutch identity,
but the Dutch population remains largely uninformed about the large minority
populations who also identify themselves as “Dutch.” Furthermore, migrant communities
are expected to conform to Dutch standards of culture and society, rather than to more
universal standards of democratic life, human rights, and state law.

V. CONCLUSION
Several conclusions can be drawn from a review of the Dutch immigration and
integration legislation. First, much like the example in Great Britain, the Netherlands
must find a balance between maintaining its sovereignty, its democracy, and its search for
‘homogenous’ identity. Globalization (and history) has made a truly uniform national
identity close to impossible. The creation of social integration exams, however, suggests
that the Dutch government is not yet ready to abandon its project of uniformity, and has
tied a relatively uniform identity with the rights of citizenship and residence.
Second, modern legislation grows a generation of minority immigrants who are
both uninformed about democratic processes and disenchanted with the Dutch majority
government. Minorities who could be an asset to the Dutch population instead become a
burden, even if only in the imaginations of majority populations or legislators.
Third, the Netherlands has a long history of supporting diversity. Reaching to the
core of its democratic traditions and core values may aid in a more protective
environment for minorities. In an era of globalization, it is not enough to teach
generations of future “Dutchmen” and “Dutchwomen.” The Netherlands has a larger
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responsibility to protect its democratic values and build generations of multicultural
citizens who are invested in the maintenance of democratic institutions.
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CHAPTER 5
SEARCHING FOR E PLURIBUS UNUM: DEMOCRACY, CITIZENSHIP, AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

I. INTRODUCTION
Aristotle writes in Politics that “If we hold...that liberty is chiefly to be found in
democracy and that the same goes for equality, this condition is most fully realized when
all share, as far as possible, on the same terms in the constitution.”215 He goes on to say
that this constitutional order “is bound to be a democracy; for the people are the majority,
and the decision of the majority is sovereign.”216 Though the composition of the “people”
representing constitutional democracies worldwide varies greatly over the centuries, the
notion of democracy itself remains only subtly changed. Even so, the most recent
developments in European governance herald delicate transformations that challenge and
envision a new form of democratic life, particularly where minorities are concerned. The
majority still remains sovereign, but the European Union has yet to envision an official
constitution—relying instead on state institutions to provide for the constitutional rights
of European citizens. Case studies from Great Britain and the Netherlands illustrate two
vital tasks for the modern democratic state: 1) refining democratic immigration and
integration legislation, and 2) defining such legislation in a way that maintains
democratic institutions and encourages the contributions of multicultural citizens.
The struggle to define a diverse European democracy is not limited to member
states alone. A general regime of liberty, democracy, and equality exists within each of
the European Union member states, though the larger European polity is inherently
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limited by the failure of all states to share the burden and responsibility of upholding a
common constitution. Aristotle’s prescriptions still hold true. Liberty and democracy at
the EU level are only partially realized without the backbone of a constitutional polity.
The rejection of a European Union constitution is a particularly instructive example of
both the possibilities and challenges that are embodied by the Union’s redefinition of
global and regional democratic life. A democratic Constitution and a strong judicial pillar
in the EU could redefine the struggle for belonging among British and Dutch citizens, as
well as in other member states. For minorities, direct involvement in the creation of a
multicultural democratic polity would offer a sense of identity and democratic investment
as well.
This chapter explores three dimensions of the European Union as an emerging
democratic polity with astounding diversity. First, I will explore the historical growth of
the Union, in order to understand its patterns of interdependent development. Second, I
will discuss in more detail the growth of European Union citizenship alongside the failure
of constitutional referendums. I will conclude the chapter by arguing that the success of
the European “democratic project” will rely on the creation of a judicial pillar of
interdependence. The lack of a well defined pillar for EU judicial participation is similar
to the more local problems minorities face at the state level. While state legislation and
other obstacles make it difficult for minorities to become invested in democratic
institutions, the Union’s “democratic deficit” is an obstacle for all citizens. This deficit
must be resolved in order for true citizenship to be possible for all Europeans.
Additionally, models for resolving this deficit offer insight into resolving the problem of
difference within the member-states themselves.
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION INTERDEPENDENCE
Economic Roots
Following World War II, it is doubtful that the French or German governments
had any knowledge that their European Coal and Steel Community would grow to
become one of the most unique global superpowers. Perhaps they did not guess even a
few years later, when the European Economic Community (EC) solidified economic
relations between a diverse group of member states. Fifty years after its creation, the EC
is not unrecognizable within its current manifestation as the European Union (EU), but it
has continued to grow in breadth and depth as the decades have passed. At present, the
growth of the European Union is arguably one of the most important developments in
global affairs as a result of both its successes and shortcomings.
In order to understand the European Union as it exists today, it is helpful to
understand the historical changes that have built the political and institutional foundations
of the EU. As was mentioned above, European cooperation began with the European
Coal and Steel Community in 1952. Though initial French concern about increasing
German economic competition after WWII was the first impetus to this union, Belgium,
The Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Germany, and Italy were the first collaborative
members of the Community.217 The creation of a more official European Economic
Community in 1957 encouraged the elimination of tariffs between member nations and
began to institutionalize the already prevalent intra-European trading and integration
networks available within the borders of its member states.218 The Maastricht Treaty in
1992 was a watershed moment for the EU as it is known today. While the plans outlined
in Maastricht retained the strong economic integration seen in previous agreements, they
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also allowed for the creation of a common foreign and security policy, as well as
increased cooperation in justice and home affairs.219 The Union continues to grow as it
brings new and more diverse member states into the legal and economic community.

Interdependence and Political Cooperation
The European Union is most important not only for its vast economic
cooperation, but also for the way this cooperation has occurred. The European Union as a
polity represents the first tangible example of such complex interdependence and
cooperation, though the project is incomplete. Political scientists Keohane and Nye and
others have offered detailed academic theories of complex interdependence, and these
theories are particularly applicable in an era of globalization.220 Mark Leonard uses
similar theories to analyze political developments in the European Union.
Mark Leonard’s text Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century is a daring text that
contains a vital lesson for any country aspiring to a role of global leadership. He
describes an integrated Europe that has the potential to challenge the world’s current
superpowers with a new form of governance and democracy that brings the whole of
Europe closer to a cooperative peace. He sees progress toward a European constitution as
a process which enshrines “the principles of ‘Network Europe,’ which is now free to
carry on its unique experiment of reinventing democracy for an age of globalization.”221
Leonard’s most important contribution to the literature on the European Union is
his realization that the EU is beginning to redefine democratic governance in the current
century. Two EU developments are particularly instructive. First, Leonard notes that
successful international cooperation is contingent not on the use of force, but on a
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relationship of co-optation which allows countries “to uphold the rules themselves, rather
than coercing them into submission.”222 This creates a system of cooperation and
collaboration between nations rather than relying on a single superpower to enforce
submission at a global level. The second redefinition of governance embodied by the
institutions of the EU is recognizes the value of “perpetual peace.”223 A concept first
delineated by Immanuel Kant, perpetual peace is representative of a “brotherhood of
republics” which has peaceful relations as a result of focused and intentional
cooperation.224 As Leonard writes, European nations have consciously worked toward
this perpetual peace following the catastrophes of two World Wars.225 Through
cooperation, negotiation, and a network of collaborative peace, European nations have
been able to secure a unique interdependent polity.
Overall, Leonard identifies European integration as a potential model for global
regionalism that promotes “global development, regional security, and open markets.”226
Leonard argues that a “domino effect” of regional integration modeled after the EU will
“change our ideas of politics, economics and redefine what power means for the twentyfirst century.”227 On a larger scale, Leonard goes so far as to suggest that the EU model of
integration could be a possible step in the direction of a world order characterized by
“perpetual peace.”228 He explores the potential benefits of a world where global affairs
are dominated by integration and a “constructive international order of peace”229 rather
than unipolarity and warfare.
In order to support his thesis, Leonard first explores the changing nature of power
and global affairs. He writes that “by coming together and pooling their sovereignty to
achieve common goals, the countries of the European Union have created a new power
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out of nothing.”230 This power, identified as “transformative power” by Leonard, is not
defined by military capabilities, nor is it concerned with the short-term goals of
warfare.231 Rather, Leonard suggests that Europe’s transformative power gives
precedence to the long-term goal of “reshaping the world.”232 The rise of this nonmilitary power is a direct result of the realization that one-sided displays of hard power
are no longer an effective way of ensuring that the interests of states are met in the
modern world. As Leonard notes, “The lonely superpower can bribe, bully, or impose its
will almost anywhere in the world, but when its back is turned, its potency wanes.”233 A
similar thesis might prove supportable in cases where cultural interdependence is
desirable in diverse member-states.
In response to this changing global reality, Leonard identifies that European
integration has spurred a new trend of transformative power and a new “European way of
war.”234 This transformative power means that co-optation rather than coercion is used as
the most important method for gaining consent from other states.235 Though the use of
force as an end in itself has been the traditional norm of the Westphalian state system, the
use of direct force in the current era is increasingly met with resistance and resentment.236
In contrast to the use of force in a state-centric system, the strength of transformative
power in the regional system of the European Union is primarily a result of the EU’s
“ability to reward reformers and withhold benefits from laggards.”237 Rather than
resorting to open hostilities with each other, EU member-states agree on a common set of
goals and values that are internalized and buttressed by the member-states themselves.238
Because European institutions operate with an “invisible hand” that allows legislation to
grow out of national interests, individual member states have a vested interest in
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supporting regional integration.239 In contrast to the relatively peaceful relations between
European states, Leonard also suggests that the “European way of war” includes the use
of force in order to build peace and “defend Europe’s value” through the form of
humanitarian intervention.240
Despite Leonard’s faith in European progress, the democratic process is far from
complete. A closer look at processes of citizenship and constitutionalism in the European
Union reveals unsolved problems—the integration of minorities is only one of many
related to citizenship and democratic life. European Union economic and security
interdependence, despite its potential, lacks a complete democratic interdependence. The
next section will suggest that European citizenship without a Constitution or legal pillar
may prevent such interdependence.

III. THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF CITIZENSHIP AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EU
Citizenship and Democracy
European Union citizenship was officially established with the entry into force of
the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam.241 Though legal European Union
citizenship exists through commonly accepted treaties, this citizenship is complicated by
member-state nationality requirements and immigration statutes. European Union
citizenship is the product of member states, rather than an autonomous creation. Thus,
European Union citizenship can only be conferred through the member-states, and is not
entirely standardized from member-state to member-state. The lack of standardization
and enforcement power in the area of judicial cooperation leaves many citizens turning to
their member-states for participation in democratic life.
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EU citizens have many privileges, but are relatively removed from the
governmental processes at the heart of EU governance. In addition to individual citizens’
worries about representation, smaller member-states find it difficult to surrender their
sovereignty to a governmental body that does not fully recognize their opinions. Philippe
Schmitter writes that the EU, while not plagued by a democratic crisis, is challenged by
general symptoms of democratic morbidity and disenchantment within the EU citizenry,
as well as by an increasing awareness of undemocratic representation.242 The rejection of
the EU Constitution is the most vivid example of this discontent. While the European
Union continues to redefine democracy even now, the EU specialties in “trade
liberalization, monetary policy, the removal of non-tariff barriers, technical
regulation...foreign aid, and general foreign policy co-ordination” are of little interest to
the average European citizen.243 As Leonard writes, “none of the policies in the five most
important issues for voters in Europe – health care provision, education, law and order,
pension and social security policy, and taxation – are set by the European Union.”244
Asking citizens to approve a dense constitution like that of the EU, then, was perhaps a
premature effort.

The Rejection of a Constitution
In 2002, under the guidance of the former French President Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, a group of 105 EU representatives gathered at a European Convention in order
to revise previous Union treaties.245 After over a year of debate and discussion, the
convention unanimously approved a draft Constitution for the EU which was
subsequently reviewed and approved in June of 2004 by an Intergovernmental
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Conference of the member states’ heads of government.246 Finally, a few months later, on
October 29, 2004, the European constitution was officially signed by member state
governments at a conference in Rome.247 The signatures marked a crucial moment in the
history of European Union development, but the permanent success of the European
constitution also relied upon its affirmative ratification through democratic process in the
individual member states. Whether the moment of ratification is reached through
parliamentary approval or popular referendum, the constitution can only be brought into
force when it is approved and ratified by all of the EU member states.248 In a recent wave
of popular disapproval, however, both Dutch and French citizens rejected the proposed
European constitution, thereby halting government ratification of the document.249
Popular responses to European integration have been relatively unpredictable over
the past decade, but the “impressive display...of popular dissatisfaction” embodied by the
Dutch and French rejections have led to claims that “the EU is increasingly paying the
price...for integrating at the administrative level without offering the public a clear vision
of integration and its benefits.”250 The span of only a few days between France’s rejection
of the constitution on May 29, 2005, and the Netherlands’ rejection on June 1st was a
surprise to many European Union and state political leaders.251 The historical role of both
France and the Netherlands at the heart of European Union expansion makes the two
rejections all the more shocking. BBC World Affairs correspondent Paul Reynolds writes
in an editorial following the French rejection that “This is not like Britain saying "No".
That would be a problem. This is a crisis. It means that something is rotten in the state of
Europe.”252
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The Dutch rejection only days after the French’s rejection simply added salt to an
open wound. As Dutch scholar Ben Crum notes, “The Netherlands is traditionally
counted among the EU member states most dedicated to the integration project.”253 To
have the Dutch populace dismiss the carefully articulated European constitution by a
staggering 60 percent “left the European elite reeling and facing the prospect of a
protracted period of recrimination, conflict and crisis.”254 The two rejections raise larger
questions about the future of European integration, and British foreign secretary Jack
Straw suggested following the referendums that the negative reactions raise “profound
questions for all of us about the future direction of Europe.”255 French President Jacques
Chirac and German chancellor Gerhard Schröder echoed these sentiments.256 A rightwing Dutch politician suggested following the failed referendum that problems in the
Netherlands are to blame, though others blame larger European problems.257 Although
the possibility of an EU constitution was not destroyed by the recent referendums, the
deeper issues prompting their rejection must be dealt with before long-term unity can be
achieved. The variety of unconquered European obstacles contributing to the negatively
received referendums will be discussed in the next section of the paper.
A variety of unresolved problems lie beneath the surface of European integration.
The failed referendums in France and the Netherlands are indicative of the growing
importance of these issues, though the referendums fortunately do not bring about a true
reversal of integration. Regardless, the negative reactions prompt a strong need for
European self-evaluation and reformation at the level of the political elite. In a general
sense, the referendums illustrate a growing discontent with the gap between individual
European citizens and their representatives at the European level. As Paul Reynolds
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writes, “The institutions of the EU have got ahead of the peoples of the EU.”258 Overall,
citizens are wary of relinquishing their hold on the security provided by states. The
problem is only exacerbated by the fact that citizens increasingly feel alienated by both
their state governments and EU institutions alike.
The Guardian Unlimited reports that “Growing anti-Muslim sentiment,
opposition to EU membership for Turkey, and fears over losing control of immigration
policy” were all large factors contributing to the rejected referendums.259 The BBC notes
that “many voters feel that Brussels has too much power and that their national politicians
are not protecting them enough.”260 Dutch voters were also concerned that liberal state
policies on drugs and gay marriage would be changed at the EU level, and were
disillusioned by rapid EU enlargement and the single Euro currency.261 For the Dutch
voters, as well as the French, the growth of the bureaucracy in Brussels represents a
threat to “liberal values,” national identity, and an increase in faceless economic
integration.262 In short, questions of sovereignty, rapid European integration, cultural
preservation and opposition to minorities, and a democratic deficit are all being put
forward by a European public that has been pushed to the margins in the past.

IV. THE INTERDEPENDENCE MODEL: A DEMOCRATIC WAY FORWARD
Despite drawbacks, democratic interdependence seems the most effective way
forward for the European Union, as well as for Great Britain and the Netherlands as
individual member-states. Several significant authors have influenced my understanding
of this concept, though one in particular guides my general arguments. Herbert J. Spiro
introduces a “third way” for interdependence between the relinquishment of national
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sovereignty and the growth of supranational government.263 Spiro argues that the
historical example of American democracy has been misinterpreted as purely
supranational.264 While the United States has supranational qualities, Spiro suggests that
its legacy of E pluribus Unum “did not proceed from a centre, was not pushed from
above, and was not obtained by force.”265
Spiro instead attributes the growth of the American polity to a process of
interdependence, through which “regions of the country and both horizontal and vertical
groupings of the people have become increasingly aware of their complex, mutual
dependence upon one another.”266 The European Union seeks its own democratic legacy
in the current century. Partly out of necessity, perhaps out of idealism, the EU brings
together nations that were at war less than a century ago. The method is different, but the
purpose the same—to create an interdependent one out of many.
The failure of constitutional referendums, worries about immigration and
multiculturalism, and member state challenges with minority communities all bring new
definition to the European democratic project. In the current century, pressed by
globalization and international forces, the European Union seeks its own democratic
legacy. These new realities suggest the need for an increase in democratic
interdependence. Democracies in the current age—particularly the growth of new
democracies—require an unprecedented level of interdependence. As multicultural
communities grow, and as the European Union expands to include more diverse
communities, democratic institutions will rely on the interdependent cooperation of all
individuals, member states, and Union representatives. As Spiro notes, this
interdependence may be both conscious and unconscious—directed and mediated or
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simply “transmitted through the various overlapping networks of the polity, of which
once perceives oneself as a more or less integral component part.”267 In either case,
successful multicultural and diverse democracies rely on some form of interdependent
investment in the fibers of democratic being. At the level of the European Union, several
scholars have discussed the resolution of the polity’s democratic deficit and offered
potential solutions to a variety of challenges associated with democratic interdependence.
Several of these scholars and the significant problems they address will be discussed
here.

Elizabeth Bomberg and Alexander Stubb: Governance and Legitimacy
Before the Constitutional referendums, Bomberg and Stubb identified several
problems of governance and legitimacy that continue to plague EU officials. Where
governance is concerned, the EU institutions lend themselves to a system of isolated
bureaucracy, rather than the democratic representation that is so essential and familiar to
European citizens.268 While democratic participation at the EU level is arguably more
important than local participation in state politics, the European Parliament does not
effectively live up to its responsibility of representing the European public.269 As
decisions made at the EU level begin to impact citizens more overtly, a strong system of
democratic representation becomes all the more essential. Though Bomberg and Stubb do
not provide a solution to the problem of representative governance, understanding the
complicated history of governance in the EU is important for deciphering the more
obvious discontent today.
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Institutional and democratic legitimacy is an equally important dilemma facing
the EU today. Legitimacy, identified in terms of democracy, performance, and identity, is
a constant challenge to the EU.270 Democratic legitimacy and governance, as discussed
above, is limited by a weak Parliament, decreasing citizen participation, and the
confidential nature of important decision making.271 Where performance is concerned,
the removal of economic barriers and the creation of a common market have substantially
integrated European economies, but many individual citizens are negatively impacted by
this integration.272 Without concerted efforts on the part of European institutions to
reverse the negative effects of integration on European populations, public opposition is
not a surprising development.
The final dilemma of integration identified throughout Bomberg and Stubb’s
work is the absence of a common European identity. Over the past decade, the EU’s
geographic membership has expanded drastically, though a common European identity
has not spread with the borderlines. Member states are integrated by political and
economic institutions, but the myriad cultures that are subsumed under the umbrella of
“European” have not reached a similar level of amalgamation. Resistance to Turkish
accession into the EU and a general wariness of Muslim minorities are two examples of
the conflicts between cultures. Furthermore, national and state identities are more potent
than the often ambiguous “European” identity, as was seen during the referendums in
France and the Netherlands when national identities and interests were used to legitimize
the rejection of the EU constitution. Until a common thread is found that will link the
peoples of Europe together, the process of EU integration will always be finite.
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Sadly, Bomberg and Stubb offer few solutions to the variety of problems they
identify. Their text is primarily a historical one, though its undercurrents show a
favoritism for a more integrated European Union. While the rejected referendums do not
themselves halt progress in the EU, the larger issues identified in part by the authors must
be resolved if the EU is to avoid major roadblocks in the future. Thus, it is helpful to
examine other texts and the prescriptions of other authors in order to more critically
evaluate the challenges and possibilities of European integration.

Prescriptions for Democracy
Philippe Schmitter’s book How to Democratize the European Union...And Why
Bother? offers great discernment into the process of European Union development. He
extends a historical account of democracy and integration in the European Union by
examining the need for democratic processes in the areas of citizenship, representation,
and decision making. Schmitter did not predict the popular rejection of a European
constitution directly, though he did recognize the dangers of an undemocratic regional
system of governance. Rather than confining the European Union to pre-existing models,
Schmitter explores the possibility that the European Union’s emphasis on collaborative
decision making and negotiation will result in a form of democratic governance that is
completely new.273 In order to embrace democratic life, however, Schmitter suggests that
several changes are necessary.
The most important of Schmitter’s reforms include increased citizen participation
through European representative elections and more frequent referendums.274 This would
allow individual citizens across the EU the opportunity to have a more regular impact on
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the operations of European supranational institutions. In combination with reforms that
would protect non-nationals under European auspices as citizens, grant general EU
citizenship, and introduce social welfare programs, opportunities for participation could
resolve the sentiments of alienation felt by many European citizens.275 Eventually,
individuals granted citizenship within the European Union would also be responsible for
contributing monetarily to the maintenance of democratic institutions, thus maintaining
the financial stability of the integrated system. Within European Union institutions,
decision making processes could be made more accountable through the implementation
of a variety of representation mechanisms that would ensure both proportional and
functionally specific voting weights within the European Council and Parliament.276
For Schmitter, the most effective form of democracy is one which recognizes the
importance of rule by numeric majority, but also the weight of intense minority values.277
He writes that decisions made by numeric majorities can collide intensely with the
interests of minority populations, and that it is the role of democratic institutions to
“displace, if not replace, the majority principle with some other decision rule that
recognizes disproportionately or protects explicitly the preferences of minority…within
the same political process.”278 Within the context of territorial expansion, balancing
majority and minority interests is especially important. In order to avoid fragmentation
and widespread discontent with EU institutions, the EU will ultimately need to strike an
even balance between small coalitions and larger minorities. Additionally, the
frameworks for citizenship and representation will need to be strengthened before
democracy in the EU can be successful.
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EU institutional weaknesses in the area of political integration only impede the
possibilities of European citizenship and belonging that are so far from becoming
realities. Indeed, Europe has no universal regional culture, and European “citizens” are
pulled in seemingly opposite directions in the face of layered “local, regional, national,
and supranational” identities.279 More importantly, these identities and the welfare of
individuals have become less important at the European level than the state, economic,
and business interests that frequently occupy politicians.280 Even at the time of publishing
in 2000, Schmitter identified increasing “symptoms of morbidity” among the European
populace, accompanied by unaccountable decision making behind the closed doors of EU
institutions.281 In order to resolve these problems, reforms that include both the interests
of the numeric majority and the passions of minority groups will need to be undertaken in
the long-term by European governments.282 Following the failure of politicians to
effectively bring European nations under a common constitution, these reforms are all the
more necessary.

The Option of Federalism: A United States of Europe
Even among supporters of European integration, many scholars argue against a
“United States of Europe.” Schmitter, for example, argues that currently available models
for governance will not suit the European Union. In contrast, Glyn Morgan argues in The
Idea of a European Superstate that a federal European state is one of the only ways to
successfully integrate Europe. Though his arguments are more controversial than other
authors, he approaches European integration from a perspective that is perhaps more
accessible to the average European citizen. Essentially, Morgan’s work returns to the
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very project, process, and product of integration itself and seeks to justify every
dimension in terms of public interests.283 Furthermore, Morgan’s arguments differ from
others in favor of integration as a result of his refusal to use economic, welfare, or
sovereignty as justifications for European integration (or disintegration). Though his
work has flaws on its own, it does introduce a perspective on public opinion in the EU
which does not see European integration as an inevitable end. Morgan’s work emerges as
a valuable addition to the more specific discourse on popular discontent and public
opinion in the context of an unfinished European integration project.
In seeking to affirm European integration by using a democratic standard, Morgan
suggests that European integration could be justified to both skeptics and adherents in
terms of individual security.284 He continues this idea by arguing that a federal European
state is the only model of governance that can successfully ensure individual security,
whether this is defined primarily as military, economic, food, environmental, or cultural
security.285 Though his thesis seems to simply co-opt the available model of federalism
envisioned in existing models like the United States, it does raise the larger issue of
individual protection that is so vitally important to citizens. In an era where states are
often unable to protect their constituencies from outside attacks on security and hard
power cannot function alone, some form of regional governance that begins to balance
individual interests with government demands is needed. The failure of constitutional
referendums in France and the Netherlands speaks to the confusion that voters face when
attempting to navigate the decreasing effectiveness of individual state sovereignty and the
gaps that are still present in an expanding system of regional governance.
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Morgan writes that “People in early modern Europe came, over a period of
generations, to shift the horizon of their loyalties and attachments from the local to the
national. There is no reason why, under the right combination of circumstances, this
could not happen again.”286 For Morgan, these circumstances include justifying the
project of integration in terms of security, and transferring the powers of foreign,
security, and defense policy to the European level.287 It is important to note, however,
that the European institutions need to demonstrate a significant level of effectiveness to
the European public before full integration can become a reality.288 Furthermore, citizens
will need to assume and recognize their responsibility for and their impact on the
institutions that govern them. If they continue to feel completely removed from the
practices at the European level, no amount of justification will make a constitutional or
federal European polity succeed.

Multiculturalism and Democracy
As European news sources stated following the French and Dutch referendums,
growing anti-Muslim sentiments and the desire to preserve genuine “European” cultures
were cited frequently as factors which influenced the negative response to the EU
constitution. Unfortunately, these factors not only influence popular referendums, but the
everyday lives of minorities who attempt to integrate into European societies. In her book
The Islamic Challenge, Jytte Klausen outlines the realities of ethnic intolerance in
European nations and the political difficulties which face growing European Muslim
communities. On one hand, the anti-Muslim reactions from Europeans reflect the
reluctance to admit Turkey into the European Union and the general desire to preserve

- 84 -

European morals and values. On the other hand, the “Islamic Challenge” reflects a deeper
religious and cultural intolerance within European societies. The process of successfully
integrating difference confronts secular and religiously affiliated states alike, and it is
testing the very quality of European democracy.
Rather than posing an insolvable difficulty, the challenge of cultural and ethnic
minorities in the European Union is an issue that can be overcome with openness and
cooperation on the part of both Europeans and minorities. Indeed, Klausen suggests that
the introduction of Islam into European societies is not deeply divisive or reflective of a
“clash of civilizations,” but a matter of domestic policy reform.289 The present unrest
over Muslim populations in Europe arises out of both a realization that Muslims intend to
remain in European nations, and that European state legislators have failed to create
policies that will support and protect this growing minority.290 Successful integration will
require the cooperation and commitment of both European citizens and Muslims, though
unfair policies at the level of state governments must be dealt with first before Muslims
can accept an equal role as European citizens. Confronting difference in a democratic and
cooperative way will be a valuable lesson for state governments as well as European
institutions.
The rejected constitutional referendums represent at one level a failure of state
governments to justify publicly the integration of minorities into European society as well
as a failure to legislate policies which allow the protection of Muslim cultural
specificities. At another level, the inclusion of anti-Muslim sentiments in the reasoning
behind the negative votes suggests that the effects of the “Islamic challenge” will soon
reach the level of European Union institutions. If politicians at the state level begin to
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make policy changes that will integrate Muslim minorities more fairly, pluralistic
citizenship becomes a real possibility. Otherwise, European institutions will increasingly
find that opposition to minorities is a recurrent problem. Facing the “Islamic challenge”
will undoubtedly prove useful as the EU’s borders continue to expand and include more
diverse identities.

V. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A GLOBAL MODEL
Placing European developments within a context of globalization allows for the
EU’s broader significance to emerge. Three examples of the EU’s global instructiveness
are particularly strong.
First, the European Union should be closely scrutinized for its reinterpretation of
democratic life. The process of balancing both institutional and cultural idiosyncrasies
while remaining open to the possibility of democratic participation is a daunting task that
will be globally instructive even if it does not succeed in this century. Second, the EU
represents a unique regional mechanism that has the potential to enforce collective
political, economic, and environmental accountability. Environmental degradation, world
poverty, human rights, economic development, and long-term political stability among
other issues must be addressed by a larger community of nations. The European Union is,
so far, the most successful example of this community of nations, though admittedly on a
small scale. If ethical leaders and scholars press for the continuation of the integration
project, however, the EU may emerge as an exceptional model for global cooperation.
Finally, in returning to the concept of perpetual peace, the European Union represents the
single largest peaceful polity in the world. Beyond a simple absence of war, the Union is
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in collaboration and cooperation toward larger ideals. If a similar respect for difference,
disagreement and compromise can be reproduced around the globe, investment in the
ambition of globally interdependent nations will not be impossible.
The discourse on the European Union is far from finished. At various levels, the
European Union is combating the same challenges that other nations around the globe are
facing in differing ways. The EU becomes particularly significant, however, when it is
placed in a global context. In the coming decades, the literature and scholarly work on the
EU will benefit greatly from an increased focus on the EU’s potential as a global model
for cooperative politics and diplomacy. Democracy, citizenship, identity, and the links
between the political and the individual are all central to the discussion of the European
Union, as well as to the discussion of life in an era of globalization. The European Union
as a model for the ways in which democracy and citizenship are changing is an important
field of study as a result of its dynamism and its potential for redefining democracy. With
careful attention and progress, Europe’s example could very well lead the globe in a new
age of political morality, global cooperation, and perpetual peace.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC INTERDEPENDENCE AS A MODEL FOR
MULTICULTURALISM

The current thesis has dealt broadly with the difficulty of integrating globalized
individuals into the traditional state polity through immigration and integration
legislation. More specifically, I have argued that the increasingly restrictive immigration
and integration programs of Great Britain and the Netherlands have limited the
democratic participation and integration of ethnic minority communities in both states.
The first chapter introduced several significant concepts in understanding the
globalization of identity and its impact on the state and its legal systems—including the
notion of statehood, citizenship, globalization, integration, and legal pluralism. Through a
detailed historical analysis of legislation in Great Britain and the Netherlands, the thesis
illustrates the increasing resistance to the movement of minority communities, the tone of
this legislation, and its impact on minority integration. In the final chapter, the thesis
introduced several models for integrating diverse state bodies and institutions in the
European Union as a way to explore potential models for creating globalized and
integrated multicultural states in Europe.
No single legislative change will transform the successes or failures of
multiculturalism in Great Britain, the Netherlands, or across the European Union. Each
polity must define and invest in unique policies and programs for statehood and
citizenship in an era of globalized individuals, markets, and even security threats. Great
Britain confronts a different ethnic minority community than the Netherlands does, and
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the European Union needs unique models to encourage interdependence at a transnational
level. In practical terms at the state level, this means that both state institutions and
multicultural citizens have a responsibility to commit themselves to such projects. Both
individuals and state legislators should be held equally accountable for encouraging a
tolerant and democratic state with globalized and multicultural threads. A variety of
models exist for promoting multicultural and pluralistic states, though I am particularly
influenced by the innovative interdependence model that emerges from the growth of the
European Union itself. This model is particularly attractive for three reasons.
First, it is grounded in the European experience of managing difference. Despite
the often divisive cultural, economic, and political differences that existed in Europe
following the Second World War, interdependence emerged as a way to form a greater
economic stability. Second, the theories of interdependence can be molded to fit
transnational, state, or local necessity. Finally, and most importantly, it holds a
community and a polity equally responsible for the development of a peaceful and fairly
managed multicultural democracy. The next brief section will explore the three essential
elements in a unique model of democratic interdependence.

Building Democratic Interdependence: A Three-Part Model for Multiculturalism
Grounded in European concepts of economic interdependence, and equally
influenced by the literature that has emerged on pluralism and assimilation, I suggest a
new theoretical model is needed as a guide for both immigration and integration
legislation, and for the growth of informed hybrid citizens. For multiculturalism to
succeed as a political project in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and perhaps other
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countries, I suggest that three key components must exist. In each of the three concept
areas, equal participation is needed from both minority citizens and the state.
Interdependence, by any definition, is reliant on such participation, and it is of intense
necessity in the case of a growing multicultural state.
The first component of a successfully hybridized and multicultural state is a
common infrastructure of democratic institutions that are accessible to transitioning
minority and ethnic groups. New citizens (and even non-citizens) must become familiar
with their rights, obligations, and opportunities to participate in the democratic life of
countries like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In the beginning of its days as a
democratic melting pot, the United States was idealized and dreamed of by immigrants
all over the world. Not only economic opportunity, but democratic opportunity, fueled
these dreams. Minority citizens and new arrivals must take part in the initiative to learn
about the potential of the democratic institutions that could serve them, and make a
consistent effort to become involved in democratic processes for change. Equally, state
governments must encourage legislation that educates and informs its newest and most
diverse citizens. The concept of “democracy” and its institutions may be envisioned
differently by the state and current minority groups, but a conversation of compromise
and accommodation on both sides will be an unavoidable part of building an
interdependent and intercultural state. Throughout any process of negotiation, there must
also be a sense of investment in common democratic institutions that will be functional
and accessible to the entirety of the polity.
Building on the component of democratic institutions, the second component of a
multicultural state is a lasting environment of legitimacy and accountability, particularly
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where democratic exchanges are concerned. Minority citizens who become actively
engaged in democratic processes must be able to count on the effectiveness of the
institutions that they place their faith in. They need more than bland assurances that
minority voices are being heard. Similarly, government officials and policy makers must
receive substantial evidence that minority populations can be held accountable. If
promises are made for change on either side of the spectrum, these promises must be kept
legitimate and then followed by accompanying enforcement actions. Both minority
citizens and the state should be held responsible for maintaining the democratic
institutions that protect the polity as a whole. When suitable broad agreements are
reached between minority groups and the state, these agreements should be recognized by
law.
The third and final component that is essential to a multicultural state is
legislative and judicial authenticity. Put simply, this component gives enforcement power
to the state’s intercultural negotiations. In the United States, this supreme authenticity is
granted to minorities, the majority, and the state by the Constitution and the Courts that
preside over it. For states that have little or no protection for minority rights, this third
component weighs more heavily on their own initial efforts to ensure that legislation is
fair, impartial, and enforceable. Nonetheless, it is the responsibility of minority citizens to
follow the laws prescribed by the state and to respect a judiciary with the power to
maintain a fair democracy. If legislative changes are necessary, both the state and
minority groups must recognize the lengthy democratic process that must occur before
legislation can be made reality.
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Suggestions for Further Research
The three components I have identified are only the beginning of a theoretical
model for encouraging a successful multicultural state. As a result, they are dangerously
broad, and would significantly benefit from the inclusion of more practical and
programmatic elements. I have attempted to include some suggestions in each of the case
studies for legislative change, but resolving uncertainty around immigration legislation
alone will not provide the impetus needed for a stable and interdependent multiethnic
state. Two improvements on my own research and pathways for future research exist.
First, keeping the theoretical challenge of interdependence in mind, a more
practical research project might propose wider legislative changes or policy proposals
that go beyond the sphere of immigration and integration. The concept of
interdependence could be applied to a variety of “state-building” programs in European
nations to encourage multicultural identities and legislation, but only with additional and
focused quantitative research. Additional research on conflict resolution theories or
integration theories might also prove fruitful in negotiating multicultural European states.
Secondly, a narrower focus on the specific ethnic groups and their successes and
difficulties with integration would have provided an entirely different lens for the project.
Though my background is not anthropological, a qualitative study of a particular ethnic
group in one case study country would be a beneficial way to test the theories of
interdependence that I have developed. More importantly, a qualitative analysis might
introduce new theories that are common among minority communities themselves.
Growing interdependence and multicultural theories from the roots of ethnic communities
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would no doubt produce different results than my own “top-down” approach of looking
at European Union institutions.
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